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Summary
Managing the information assets of public and private organizations is a rapidly growing and
important field. Information leakage is a significant problem for these organizations, forcing them
to develop information security and damage-mitigation methods. In Japan, an average of 1,231
incidents of information leakage occurred every year from 2005 to 2017. Electronic media have
had over half of the incidents than did paper media since 2016.
Cyberattack is a the principal cause of information leakage occurs. Such attacks may be either
internal or external. The adversary uses a vulnerability of the software, a missing implementation
of the hardware, or a weak user password to intrude on the internal network and its constituent
devices. The danger of cyberattacks has led to information leakage countermeasures, to the
adoption of international standards and sector guidelines, and to the requirement of certification
in incident protection for information systems and organization staffs. A coordinated response,
and cooperation between affected organizations, is essential. Incident response teams are now
commonly set up to prevent information leaks, to react rapidly to incidents when they occur, and
to handle disclosure.
One useful strategy is to employ multiple layers of defense for protection against cyberattack,
reduction of damage, and identification of perpetrators. Mutual complementation of multiple
layers suppresses risk to an information system. It ensures that another mitigating security
mechanism is already prepared when one has been compromised. Network, hardware, and
software, in this strategy, all have their own security mechanisms with appropriate policies and
run-time assurances. Additionally, penetration testing is constantly used to simulate cyberattacks
on the information system. Incident handling and digital forensics units, working together, identify
the effects of the incident on the information system.
In this dissertation, the focus is on defending the operating system (OS) and the applications.
These layers manage and handle information assets on information systems, then detect and
prevent information leakage. Moreover, in order to identify information leakage using appropriate
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detection and prevention methods, it is difficult to monitor the actual behavior of OS, application
traffic contents, and identification of the application from inside the network. The combination
of OS monitoring, application traffic monitoring, and identification of suspicious libraries of
applications is necessary to achieve information security through multiple layers of defense:
• OS monitoring
To identify kernel memory corruption and illegally overwritten kernel code, and malevolent
data in the kernel virtual memory
• Application traffic monitoring
To identify information leakage and other traffic from applications requesting excessive
permissions
• Suspicious application library identification
To use network traffic modeling to identify applications requesting excessive permissions
Countermeasures against attacks targeting an OS kernel can be highly effective in preventing
security compromises caused by kernel vulnerabilities. An adversary uses such attacks to overwrite
credentials, thereby gaining the ability to overcome security features through arbitrary program
execution. To protect the OS, CPU features such as supervisor mode access prevention, supervisor
mode execution prevention, and the no-execute bit facilitate access-permission control and data
execution in the virtual memory. Linux further reduces the danger from kernel exploits by using
several other protective methods, such as kernel address space layout randomization, control flow
integrity, and kernel page table isolation. A combination of these methods can indeed mitigate
the attack, as kernel vulnerability relies on the interaction between the user and kernel modes;
nevertheless, kernel virtual memory corruption can still occur (e.g., the eBPF vulnerability allows
malicious memory overwriting in the kernel mode). The kernel memory observer (KMO), an
alternative design for virtual memory proposed in this dissertation, uses a secret observation
mechanism to monitor kernel virtual memory and detect illegal data manipulation/writing.
KMO determines whether kernel virtual memory corruption has occurred, inspects system-call
arguments, and forcibly unmaps the direct mapping area. An evaluation of KMO reveals that it can
detect kernel virtual memory corruption and quickly identifies the failing security feature through
actual kernel vulnerabilities. In addition, the results indicate that the system call overhead latency
ranges from 0.002 µs to 8.246 µs, and the web application benchmark from 39.70 µs to 390.52
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µs for each HTTP access, whereas KMO reduces these overheads by using tag-based translation
lookaside buffers.
The applications layer also requires defense. Many applications that are “free” to the user
carry advertisements. While advertisement (ad) modules provide useful services, they also track
user behavior statistics for commercial or other purposes. Users generally accept this business
model, but, in most cases, the applications do not require a user’s permission to transmit sensitive
information. Therefore, such applications’ behavior potentially constitutes an invasion of privacy.
Analyzing the network traffic and permissions of 1,188 Android applications, it was found that
93% connected to multiple destinations when using the network, and 55% required a permission
combination that included both access to sensitive information and the use of networking services,
with obvious potential for leakage. Of the 107,859 HTTP packets from these applications, 23,309
(22%) contained sensitive information, as identified by string matching with a device identification
number and carrier name. To enable users to control the transmission of their private information,
the proposed system uses a novel clustering method based on the HTTP packet destination and
content distances to generate signatures and thereby detect the leakage of sensitive information
from Android applications. This system does not require that the Android framework be modified.
Thus, users can easily add the proposed system to their devices and manage the network behavior
of suspicious applications in a fine-grained manner. In tests, the system accurately detected 97%
of the sensitive information leakage from the applications evaluated, with only 3% false negative
results and 3% false positive results.
Another goal is to identify suspicious application libraries likely to leak information. In
analyzing the network traffic of 1,188 Android applications, the analyzing result indicates 797
applications that included previously known ad modules. It was noted that ad modules exhibit
characteristic network traffic patterns for acquiring repeatedly used content, specifically images.
These patterns are evident in network traffic graphs mapping the relationships among HTTP
session data (such as HTML or JavaScript). In order to accurately differentiate between the
ad modules’ network traffic and valid application network traffic, the proposed system adopts a
novel method based on the distance between session graphs and the graphs of known ad modules.
This distance describes the similarity between the sessions. For evaluation, 20,903 graphs of
applications were generated. The system separated the application graphs into those generated
by known ad modules (4,698 graphs), those manually identified as ad modules (2,000 graphs), and
standard application traffic (2,000 graphs). The system applied 1,000 graphs of known ad modules
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to the other graph sets (the remaining 3,698 known ad graphs, the 2,000 manually classified ad
graphs, and 2,000 standard graphs) to see how accurately ad graphs could be distinguished. The
evaluation showed a 76% detection rate for known ad graphs, a 96% detection rate for manually
classified ad graphs, and an under 10% false positive rate for standard graphs.
In sum, this dissertation presents several elements of a multi-layer defense against information
leakage, concentrating on the OS and application layers. To guard the OS against cyberattack, the
KMO virtual memory system is proposed. To guard mobile device users against various forms of
information leakage, two new detection methods are developed. The efficacy of these approaches
is supported by the observed results. This work should prove valuable to future researchers in the
field of information security.
Division of Industrial Innovation Sciences
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Information Leakage
The information systems of public and private organizations possess large amounts of
information used for service development and financial management. The leakage of information
assets via unauthorized access has a significant impact on government, business, and individual
security. The rate of information leakage in Japan is shown in Figure 1.1. In 2018 alone, there
were 443 reported information leaks. On average, 1,231 incidents were reported every year
from 2005 to 2017. Since 2016, electronic media have proven more vulnerable to leakage than
paper media [1]. The largest cause of information leakage from electronic media is a cyberattack,
which may involve outside unauthorized access, insider misuse of valid accounts, or loss of media
devices [2, 3]. Outside attackers break through protective mechanisms by exploiting software or
hardware vulnerabilities or guessing a user’s weak password. Inside attackers use valid credentials
(whether their own or stolen from other users) to log in to a file server or database server. In either
case, adversaries reach information assets, then expose them to parties outside the organization.
Leakage of personally identifiable information has taken place in both the national public sector
[4, 5] and the private sector [6, 7, 8]. Additionally, specific cyberattacks sometimes directly target
an organization’s intellectual or financial property [9, 10, 11]. In this dissertation, information
assets are categorized into three types: personal information, intellectual property, and financial
property (see Figure 1.1). The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) / International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 27000 series provides precise classification guidelines for
information assets using stored media, secrecy level, and category attribution [12].
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Figure 1.1 Annual statistics of information leakage cases in Japan [1].
Information security relies on the use of national, international, and industry-wide standards
[2, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. These establish the combination of protective methods and organizational
policies necessary to ensure security. Certification also indicates that staff have the education,
psychology, and motivation that minimize the risk of internal illegality [17]. A computer security
incident response team (CSIRT) and product security incident response team (PSIRT) manage the
total security of the information system and products, and respond by handling any risks (e.g.,
vulnerability disclosure, patch management, and information leaking). Such handling requires a
systematic incident response with related organizations [18, 19].
An information leakage scenario containing the elements of attack strategy, threat, and
countermeasure is indicated in Figure 1.2. Lockheed Martin’s cyber kill chain is a representative
example of an advanced persistent threat (APT) attack; it defines seven stages of attack [20], from
reconnaissance through device compromise [21]. MITRE ATT&CK provides a knowledge base of
adversary activity, techniques, and incident details sufficient to identify attack paths and damage
to information system without difficulty [22].
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Table 1.1 Information leakage cases by type.
Type Detail External attack Internal attack
Personal Information Personally Identifiable Information Ecuador [4] Yahoo US [6]
Japan Pension Service [5], Adobe [7] Benesse [8]
Intellectual Property Technical information, Software Shadowbroker [9] Trade Secret Disclosure
Management Information
Financial Property Legal Currency, Securities Bangladesh Bank [10] Embezzlement
Crypto asset Coincheck [11]
Table 1.2 Countermeasure guidelines and standards for information leakage.
Grade Countermeasure document
Standard NISC [2], NIST SP800 [13], ISO / IEC 27000 [12], and ISO 28000 [26]
Industry Standard FISC [14], PCI DSS [15], HIPAA [16], and P Mark [17]
Education Security Guideline of Targeted Email [21], Cloud [24], and IoT [25]
Multiple layers of defense are effective countermeasures against an attack and the subsequent
compromised-device stage [23]. They include preparing suitable security quality of inbound,
outbound , and internal of information asset control and management at the network and device
levels and training management staff to have and retain cybersecurity knowledge and to take quick
action in response to any incident.
1.2 Multi-layered defense as an information leakage countermeasure
Many computer devices connect through the network infrastructure; the constructing of recent
information systems used the complex software to that manages user credential information, and
information assets. This complexity means that multiple layers of defense are important for
preventing information leakage with certainty, for incident response, and for digital forensics and
damage reduction.
A multi-layered defense against several types of threats is summarized in Figure 1.3. The main
purpose of the multiple layers of security is the prevention and detection of information leakage.
Security mechanisms must assume a level of risk exists in each layer. It requires yet another layer
that the adversary must break, another layer for reducing the damage, and one for verification and
for tracing the attack sequence on the compromised information system.
Security mechanisms must adequately cover the entire information system: network, hardware,
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Figure 1.2 Scenario of cyberattack, threat, and countermeasure [20, 21, 22].
and software. For example, a Root-of-Trust supports the integrity of the hardware and software,
while access control manages the relationship between an information asset and its potential users.
Any practical information system requires a penetration test in which a cyberattack is simulated,
incident-handling vulnerabilities are revealed to support patch management by the CSIRT / PSIRT,
and the forensics are analyzed. Information on the system should be logged for sharing with law
enforcement agencies. Such a combination of security mechanisms should support the gathering
of clues from the compromised information system about the adversary’s command and network
activity and help with quick detection of the damage of disclosure due to the specific incident.
Attack techniques evolve as information systems do. Thus, new security guidelines are required
for the Cloud [24], the Internet of Things (IoT) [25], and supply chain management [26]. With
both old and new technologies, it is important to ensure that systems are constructed to ensure
trust, the fundamental common component for the construction of system and service [27].
The operating system (OS) and the applications are necessary layers for storing and accessing an
information asset. To identify that an outside adversary is attempting to seize direct control of these
layers, appropriate monitoring is the most practical security mechanism. Combined monitoring of
OS and application traffic to detect information leakage at these levels has not been attempted in
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Figure 1.3 Overview of threats and multi-layered defenses.
previous research works. It is difficult to identify suspicious activity on the inside of OS kernel
behavior, and it is also hard to supply the appropriate detection of information leakage, and then to
characterize the application traffic model to identify the suspicious component of an application.
In this dissertation, appropriate OS monitoring, application traffic monitoring, and the
identification of suspicious libraries of applications are used to solve the problems associated with
an information security mechanism based on multiple layers of defense:
• OS monitoring
To identify kernel memory corruption and illegally overwritten kernel code, data is kept in
the kernel virtual memory.
• Application traffic monitoring
To identify information leakage from excessive permission application.
• Suspicious application library identification
To identify a suspicious application that gains excessive permission application, by network
traffic modeling
1.3 Background of the Problems
OS and applications are the basic software for constructing information systems. Threats to
one or the other include kernel vulnerabilities, application malware, application vulnerabilities,
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Table 1.3 Types of Vulnerabilities [28].
Exploit Content
DoS Forcing shutdown of software
Code Execution Arbitrary program execution
Overflow Breaking of stack or heap memory space
Memory Corruption Illegal overwriting in software memory space
SQL Injection Arbitrary SQL insertion and execution
XSS Arbitrary HTML or JavaScript code in Web application
Directory Traversal Reading arbitrary directory
HTTP Response Splitting Poisoning of cache by illegal HTTP response
Bypass Something Evading of access limitations
Gain Information Information gaining through illegal control
Privilege Escalation Getting of administrator privilege
CSRF Illegal HTTP request is accepted by Web application
File Inclusion Forced reading of malicious file reading
and excessive permissions. The appropriate definition of these threats will provide a better
understanding of the security approach detailed in section 1.4.
1.3.1 Threats to the Operating System
The main threat to the OS is an attack through kernel vulnerabilities, that is, software mis
implementations in the kernel, which manages hardware devices and application execution. As
seen in Table 1.3, the common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE) classification system states that
software has 13 types of vulnerabilities [28]. Kernel attack is involved in four of them, as indicated
in 1.4: kernel memory corruption, policy violation, Denial of Service, and OS information leakage.
Table 1.5 shows that Linux kernel implementations address 10 types of vulnerabilities [29]. Table
1.6 lists 16 exploitation techniques based on kernel vulnerabilities [30].
Suppose that the adversary finally achieves control of the information asset, then sends it to
the outside environment. An attacking threat to the OS has two routes: remote attack through
a network, and local attack through a user account after logging in to the device. Either requires
appropriate permission from the OS that manages the information asset, whether on local storage or
a remote file server. The adversary might also use privilege escalation to acquire an administrator
account with the highest privilege level, able to read files and use network features.
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Table 1.4 Effects of kernel vulnerability attack [29].
Effect Content
Memory corruption Overwriting or reading of kernel code / data on virtual memory
Policy violation Miss implementation of access control decision
Denial of Service Forcing kernel to stop running
OS information leakage Information leakage from uninitialized data variables
Table 1.5 Types of kernel vulnerability implementations [29].
Type Content
Missing pointer check Lack of pointer variable verification
Missing permission check Lack of permission verification
Buffer overflow Overwriting of stack or heap space
Uninitialized data Lack of initialization at variable creation
Null deference Access to Null variable
Divide by zero Zero dividing calculation
Infinite loop Occurrence of infinite loop process
Data race / deadlock Occurrence of race condition or deadlock
Memory mismanagement Inconsistent allocation of memory allocation and free
Miscellaneous Other wrong implementations
User account information is controlled on virtual memory by the kernel. Virtual memory is the
mechanism by which the OS uses flexible memory space rather than physical memory space. The
kernel prepares a virtual memory containing two types of page tables: user page-tables for each
running user process, and kernel page-tables for the running kernel itself. The reading and writing
of process, kernel code, and data require translation from a virtual address to a physical address,
i.e., directory traversal of the page tables.
Privilege escalation means overwriting from a user account to an administrator account with the
highest level of privilege (e.g., a root account on UNIX). A user account is usually managed by
a virtual address on the kernel page tables that are protected by the kernel feature. The adversary
may use a kernel vulnerability such as a memory corruption exploit that allows modification of
kernel page tables, and, in this way, can insert any program code to the kernel. This can turn a
user account into an administrator account, because kernel privilege allows the modification of
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Table 1.6 Kernel exploit techniques [30].
Technique Content
Metadata Corruption Illegal modification of meta data on the file system
Control-Flow Hijack Arbitrary control function call chain
Allocator Data Corruption Overwriting of stack
Heap Layout Control Control heap allocation mechanism
Userspace Data Access Access to user data from kernel code
Finding Kernel Objects Identification of kernel code or data virtual address
JIT Abuse Illegal use of JIT feature (e.g., eBPF)
WˆX Area Abuse Malicious modification of writing or execution exclusive space
Changing Kernel Image Malicious modification of kernel image
Bad Module Loading Installation of malicious kernel module (e.g., Rootkit)
Unbalanced set fs() Misconfiguration of kernel and user address borderline
Table 1.7 Types of application threat.
Threat Description
Malware Malicious software leads to damage to information system or user device
Application Vulnerability Mis implementation of software is used on attack
Excessive Permission Suspicious software acquires multiple privileges
any virtual address on the kernel page tables.
An adversary who achieves privilege escalation, then obtains an administrator account, controls
access to information assets, and can transfer them to the outside environment, or attack other
computer systems through the compromised OS of the device. This dissertation proposes to
circumvent this kernel-layer threat by supporting the appropriate detection of kernel page-table
modification after privilege escalation.
• OS monitoring
To support the appropriate detection of kernel page table modification after the privilege
escalation through kernel vulnerability attack at the kernel layer.
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Table 1.8 Effects of application-layer threats.
Threat Effect
Ransom demanded for information asset Loss of access to information asset
Sending information asset to outside Information leakage and breach
Infection of other computer devices Risk and damage to internal and external systems
Table 1.9 Combinations of excessive permissions (✓is permission request).
Permission Effect
Information Application Network
asset access interaction
Combination 1 ✓ ✓ Sending information asset to outside
Combination 2 ✓ ✓ Sharing information asset with other applications
Combination 3 ✓ ✓ ✓ Sending information asset to outside
Sharing information asset with other applications
1.3.2 Threats to Applications
The threats to applications listed in Table 1.7 include malware, application vulnerability, and
excessive permission. These exploits are summarized in Table 1.15.
Malware is explicitly malicious software, of which there are several types. Worms infect other
computer devices via a network; ransomware demands a ransom to decrypt files; and bots send
spam mail, causing a denial of service and information leakage from the command and control
server. Malware infection typically spreads through the downloading and execution of malicious
files attached to an email message or placed on a compromised web site, although remote attacks
through kernel or application vulnerabilities can also involve malware.
Application vulnerabilities, like kernel vulnerabilities, are software mis implementations. Their
effects are shown in Table 1.3. After an attack’s success, an adversary could use application
privileges to cause damaging effects, just as with malware.
Excessive permissions allow access to the information asset and use of the network feature of
the device at the same time. Excessive permission combinations are summarized in Table 1.9. The
application contains the main component; third party libraries require different permission to run
on the device. As a result, application requests to the user involve a combination of privileges.
This leads to the risk of information leakage, as pointed out in previous research work [31].
The granularity of privileges is an important principle. The UNIX access control allows users
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Table 1.10 Methods of application analysis (✓is supported; △ is partially supported).
Techniques Malware Application Excessive Content
vulnerability permission
Static analysis ✓ △ △ Disassemble and analyze application code and binaries
Dynamic analysis △ ✓ ✓ Analyze application internal behavior and network traffic
and groups to have the read, write, and execute permissions. Mandatory access control (MAC)
is stricter, designating category and level for users and files. Additionally, the capability and
permission allow or disallow the right to using of computer device resources (e.g., network, store,
and information asset). Several combinations of privileges may be required by the application; this
potentially increases the risk of damage from malware.
Methods for identifying application risk may be either static or dynamic (see Table 1.10). The
static analysis method disassembles an application’s execution file into source code or assembly
language, then analyzes the program structures and components. The dynamic analysis method
directly monitors API calls, system call invocation, memory usage, and network traffic content,
then analyzes this historical information while the application is running.
Static analysis is appropriate for extracting details about the application source code, such
as whether it contains a known vulnerability or grants excessive permissions. Moreover, static
analysis takes less time to analyze the entire application than does dynamic analysis. On the
other hand, it has difficulty identifying the actual use being made of the application’s features and
privileges. Static analysis cannot support file, memory, and network usage that is determined at
the running time. Additionally, obfuscation, packing techniques, hardening of an application using
complex modification and encryption are countermeasures by which an adversary can thwart a
static analysis.
Dynamic analysis is available to identify whether an application has a specific vulnerability to
attack, and information assets are contained on file reading, writing, and transferring via a network.
The weak points of dynamic analysis are that, if it cannot cover entirety of a running application
because of time limitations, it does not collect the pertinent information when the application
camouflages its behavior or does not connect to a suspicious server.
An effective countermeasure for the threat to applications requires the combination of static
analysis and dynamic analysis to cover the entire application and its actual behavior to analyze the
risk posed by the threat. Specifically, as dynamic analysis is an effective approach to identifying
information leakage, this dissertation focuses on the following approaches:
Division of Industrial Innovation Sciences
Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology
Chapter 1 Introduction 11
Figure 1.4 Number of kernel vulnerabilities registered to CVE.
• Application traffic monitoring
application traffic monitoring on a suitable monitoring system to detect and reduce the risk
of information leakage that is caused by excessive permissions;
• Suspicious application library identification
suspicious application library identification through the analysis and modeling of application
network traffic.
1.4 Research Problems
In this section, the research problems addressed in the dissertation are enumerated. The first
concerns information leakage owing to the privilege escalation through kernel vulnerability attacks
on OS security. The second concerns information leakage due to excessive permission application.
The third concerns third party library of application.
1.4.1 Operating System Monitoring
The concerning of information leakage from the information system. OS has responsible
for access control between a user account and an information asset. Adversaries can exploit
the OS kernel through such vulnerabilities. Preventive countermeasures must be developed to
mitigate their attacks. The adversary uses kernel vulnerabilities to modify the credentials in the
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kernel virtual memory; such privilege escalation can force the OS to grant root privilege to a
non-privileged user account. It allows adversaries access information assets and network features
for achieving to information leakage using root privilege.
Kernel vulnerabilities in OS have become a significant security risk [29, 32]. There are 2,240
kernel vulnerabilities in the Linux that were listed on the CVE database in 2019 (Figure1.4) [28].
Full privilege is restricted by two OS features, namely the capability [33] and MAC (e.g., SELinux
[34]) mechanisms.
The kernel has several countermeasures to prevent kernel vulnerability and data misuse. Kernel
address space layout randomization (KASLR) distributes the kernel functions and data positions
in the kernel virtual memory to conceal the virtual addresses of vulnerable functions [35]
Additionally, control flow integrity (CFI) enforces kernel function flow validation between call and
return relationships to prevent the injection of malicious code [36]. Return address monitoring of
the stack is one method to detect kernel memory corruption to prevent malicious code initialization
[37].
The CPU also has virtual memory access and an execution permission mechanism. The NX bit
(No eXecute bit) is the execution permission flag for a virtual address in a page table entry [38].
Supervisor mode access prevention (SMAP) and supervisor mode execution prevention (SMEP)
are in the CR4 register. SMAP prevents access to the user memory region, whereas SMEP prevents
code execution in the user memory region of the virtual memory at the supervisor [39]. Meltdown
vulnerability uses a side channel approach to expose directory kernel functions and data virtual
addresses. Therefore, kernel page table isolation (KPTI) has been proposed as a means of isolating
the virtual address space between the user and kernel modes in Linux [40].
Privilege restriction methods separate root privilege features to minimize the damage to the OS
environment in the event of a successful attack. Kernel and CPU countermeasures complicate
(from the attacker’s point of view) the availability of kernel vulnerabilities based on the interaction
between the user and kernel modes. However, these methods cannot prevent attacks that exploit
kernel vulnerabilities in the kernel mode alone [41, 42, 43, 44]. The adversary can avoid many
security countermeasures by executing a kernel exploit code in the kernel mode to override the
security feature functions in the kernel virtual memory (e.g., some kernel exploits disable SELinux
via memory corruption [49, 50]).
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Table 1.11 Six categories of the 130 memory corruption vulnerabilities (CVE registered) for
Linux kernel.
DoS Code Execution Overflow Bypass Feature Gain Information Gain Privileges
114 6 73 1 4 25
Table 1.12 PoC available Linux memory corruption vulnerabilities list since 2016. Types are
referring to DoS: denial-of-service, Mem. Corr.: Memory Corruption, Priv: Gain Privileges
CVE ID Types PoC Publish Date Description
CVE-2017-16995 [44] DoS, Overflow, Mem. Corr. ✓ 2017-12-27 A boundary check error in kernel/bpf/verifier.c
CVE-2017-1000112 [45] Mem. Corr. ✓ 2017-10-04 A race condition in net/ipv4/ip output.c
CVE-2017-7533 [46] DoS, Priv, Mem. Corr. ✓ 2017-08-05 A race condition in the fsnotify implementation
CVE-2016-9793 [47] DoS, Overflow, Mem. Corr. ✓ 2016-12-28 A boundary check error in net/core/sock.c
CVE-2016-4997 [48] DoS, Priv, Mem. Corr. ✓ 2016-07-03 A boundary check error in setsockopt implementation
Problem 1: Kernel Memory Corruption
Kernel vulnerabilities are implemented in several ways. Privilege escalation uses malicious
programs to overwrite the credential variable in the kernel virtual memory and gain root privilege.
The OS utilizes privilege level management to protect the kernel code or data in the kernel
virtual memory from the user mode, while KASLR / CFI reduces the success of kernel exploitation
attacks, and SMAP / SMEP restricts the kernel mode execution of malicious code in the user virtual
memory. Nevertheless, 128 memory corruption vulnerabilities were reported for the Linux kernel
in the first half of 2019 (Table 1.11) [28]. Memory corruption vulnerabilities (e.g., the eBPF
vulnerability and others in Table 1.12) are still available whereby the directory allocates malicious
code to the kernel virtual memory through a kernel vulnerability, and continue to pose a problem.
In the postulated threat model, an adversary exploits kernel vulnerability only in the kernel
mode, aiming to compromise the OS and become capable of running any program (e.g., shell
command) without security restrictions. The attacker first attempts to avoid the security features
and gain full administrator capability, changing the Linux security modules (LSM) hook function
pointer variable to disable MAC in Linux.
The assumption of the threat model of a memory corruption kernel vulnerability involving
overwriting of the kernel virtual memory space is that this occurs only in the kernel vulnerability
target memory region that includes the security feature functions pointer, kernel module
management data, and a direct mapping region. In addition, it is assumed that the BIOS, MMU,
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TLB, and other hardware are safe.
1.4.2 Application Traffic Monitoring
With the increasing popularity of smartphones and tablets, development of mobile device
operating systems (particularly for Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android, which are the most popular
choices) has drastically increased, as has the development of applications for online marketplaces
such as the AppStore and Google Play. Google’s Android is currently the most popular operating
system for smartphones, tablet devices, and application marketplaces. In February 2014, Google
Play had over 1,100,000 applications [51]. Applications available in such marketplaces are
categorized as either free or paid. This dissertation will primarily address free applications, which
often come with advertisement modules.
A smartphone retains various kinds of personal information, such as location tracking data,
the contents of the user’s address book, and the device’s unique identifier. Android provides
a framework that requires applications to have specific permissions for accessing restricted
resources. However, the Android permission framework does not completely protect the
user’s sensitive information. Applications or advertisement modules with certain permission
combinations can send the user’s sensitive information to outside servers using the network
[31, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56]. There remain some problems:
• Excessive Permission Application
In order to decouple the features of permission granularity (e.g., network access, camera,
sensitive information), and thus maintain security.
• Suspicious Application Library
While the user’s sensitive information is generally used for targeted advertising, it can also
be discovered and used by malicious parties without the original user’s awareness.
Problem 2: Excessive Permission Application
The users can use a number of free applications that have network and sensitive information
permissions. It is highly risky for users to run applications that have the possibility of sensitive
information leakage. However, the users cannot determine if sensitive information is present or
absent in their network traffic.
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Therefore, Android provides the notification page of required permission details for the users
when the application is installed. This is effective information that helps the users. Although they
can understand what kinds of resources are accessed by the runtime of the application, the users
cannot realize for what purpose the application obtains this information. Thus, they decide whether
to install an application or not on the basis of the permission list.
In addition, Android’s current model, an application requests permissions only once, on
installation. After the application is installed, all its transmissions are opaque to the users, who
have no way of determining if sensitive information is present in their network traffic. Users
would ideally prefer that they could use an application without interruption when it is only
transmitting benign data but be prompted for confirmation when the application shes to send
sensitive information over the network.
Problem 3: Suspicious Applications Library
Some free applications include an advertisement (ad) module, which provides a targeted ad to the
user and collects statistics about user behavior. Since the ad module providers pay the application
developers to include these ads in their modules, these applications are offered at no cost to the
user. This business model is widely accepted in the mobile market for “free” applications [57].
Android provides a permission framework for privilege management. To access restricted
resources, an application needs specific permissions. Generally, ad modules are offered as a
software development kit (SDK) library that an application includes in its distribution. Thus, an
application bundle combines the original application permissions with the permissions of the ad
module, and the user cannot determine which permission applies to which. Privilege separation
methods have been proposed to address this problem [58, 59], but they require modifying the
Android permission framework and presenting an accurate representation of the permissions to the
users.
1.5 Related Work
In this section, works related to the above two threat models and three problems are reviewed.
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Table 1.13 Operating system security.
Category Security measures
CPU feature NX-bit [38], SMAP / SMEP [39], MPK [63], TCB [92]
Access control Capability [33], SELinux [34]
Kernel protection CFI [36], Dataflow integrity [69]
Stack checking [37], Variable checking [72]
Kernel image protection kRˆX [74]
Kernel memory protection KASLR [35], KPTI [40], PT-Rand [73], Reliability [80]
Memory monitoring (hardware) GRIM [91]
Memory monitoring (virtualization) SecVisor [87], TrustVisor [90]
Memory monitoring (in-kernel) SIM (requires hardware support) [93]
ED-Monitor (focuses a hypervisor kernel) [94]
1.5.1 Operating System Security
Operating system security. The OS provides several security mechanisms that mainly focus on
access management of the relation between a subject and an object, and whether a policy exhibits
granularity of privilege range or type. Moreover, isolation architectures and models that control
separation combine in multiple layers from hardware to software [60, 61].
Access control. Linux also has security mechanism implementations such as SELinux [34, 62]
and a capability [33] to restrict privileges.
CPU feature. The CPU already possesses the NX-bit [38] for execution management, and
SMAP / SMEP [39] for access and the execution of joint control by a supervisor and a user of
the virtual memory space. The CPU feature MPK supports virtual memory protection [63, 64],
page-based separation instructions [65, 66], and physical memory isolation for each process [67].
Kernel protection. Prior studies have presented kernel security methods such as CFI [36] for
code flow integrity checking, and Code Pointer Integrity for the verification of a function’s return
address [68]. In addition, running kernel protection methods focus on invalid overwriting of kernel
code and data, including control flow or data flow tracing [36, 69, 70], monitoring of stack status
[37, 71], and verifying of the privilege variable [72].
Kernel image protection. Kernel protection methods often involve randomized page table
positions in the physical memory [73]. kRˆX restricts the permission of the kernel memory layout
[74]. KMO has different merits: switching of the virtual memory space has no effect for attacks via
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Figure 1.5 Operating system security comparison of related work.
kernel vulnerabilities, and it causes no interruption when running the kernel code. This suggests
that several existing kernel security mechanisms ought to be used in coordination.
Kernel memory protection. KASLR [35] for virtual memory randomization, and KPTI or
another method that separates the virtual memory space between the user and the kernel, can
reduce the effects of attacks on the kernel memory [40, 75]. Moreover, virtual memory protection
methods separate the memory space by the domain and granularity of memory access control
[76, 77, 78, 79]. Additionally, the separation of the device driver code from the kernel provides
granularity monitoring points [80, 81].
Kernel attack. Several attack concepts target the kernel virtual memory [40, 82, 83] to evade the
above security mechanisms by the side channel attack. The kernel attack method uses both return
oriented programming and anti-CFI [84], whereas the direct mapping space method can execute
the attack code only in the kernel mode [32, 85]. The device driver has a directory threat surface
[86]. Kernel virtual memory monitoring is essential to mitigating these attacks in kernel mode.
Memory monitoring (vitalization). Memory monitoring mechanisms are run under the kernel
layer and are unaffected by kernel vulnerability. Kernel monitoring mechanisms have a hypervisor,
and a secure mode has been proposed [61, 87, 88, 89]. In particular, SecVisor [87] and TrustVisor
[90] ensure that only the verified kernel code is running.
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Table 1.14 Kernel monitoring feature comparison (✓is supported; △ is partially supported).
Feature SecVisor [87] SIM [93] ED-Monitor [94] KMO
Memory Corruption Detection ✓ ✓ ✓
Memory Corruption Protection △ △
System Call Argument Inspection ✓ ✓
In Kernel Interception ✓ △ ✓
Kernel Integrity ✓ ✓ △
Cloud Environment Deployment △ △ ✓
Memory monitoring (hardware). GRIM also has a verified kernel code at the GPU layer [91],
and Trusted Computing Base [92] verifies the integrity of the kernel code at the boot sequence.
Memory monitoring (in-kernel). Monitoring of the same layer as the OS or hypervisor has a
low overhead when hardware assistance is available [93, 94, 95].
The summarized of comparison between related works and KMO’s monitoring feature that
resides in the kernel (Figure 1.5). KMO requires relatively small overhead with the existing
hypervisor methods. These methods target invalid overwriting of the kernel code or privilege
variable in the kernel virtual memory with hardware assistance. These are effective methods
to reduce or trigger kernel monitoring, as needed. Additionally, the evaluation of the KMO
mechanism’s capability to protect existing kernel vulnerabilities and maintain stable operation
on the system, and the co-operation with other security mechanisms (e.g., SELinux, KASLR, and
SMAP / SMEP) should be undertaken.
Comparison with Related Work
The security features of KMO have been compared with those of three existing
kernel-monitoring methods (Table 1.14) [87, 93, 94]. KMO satisfies almost all the identified
requirements for the running kernel and the cloud environment.
SecVisor [87], which completely monitors the kernel from the hypervisor layer, intercepts device
access to maintain kernel integrity; however, the inspection granularity has the limitation of being
dependent on hardware assistance. Secure in VM (SIM) [93] directly inserts an alternative address
space into the guest kernel from the hypervisor to monitor the kernel. The event driven (ED)
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Table 1.15 Application traffic monitoring and modeling.
Category Method
Network traffic monitoring Attack detection [96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102]
Signature generation [103, 104]
Network traffic modeling Malware detection [108, 109, 110, 111]
Information leakage (host) Framework modification [115, 116]
Permission separation [55, 58, 59, 123]
Policy enhancement [117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122]
Suspicious library (static analysis) Application analyzing [31, 54, 127, 128, 129, 130]
Network traffic investigation [56]
Monitor [94] ensures hypervisor integrity as the same layer focuses on memory protection by
having the kernel module insert a hooking placement.
Although this privilege layer monitoring approach is similar to the KMO architecture, KMO
provides finer inspection points for memory protection and detection through system calls or the
insertion of a kernel function flow. Finally, although KMOmay struggle to set a suitable inspection
point on a kernel, users can monitor kernels effectively by using a combination of existing methods.
KMO helps protect device drivers or other potentially vulnerable regions by reducing the attack
surface of the system.
1.5.2 Application Information Leads Leakage Detection
Network traffic monitoring. Previous work on signature generation using clustering focused
on the similarity of network traffic or on the characteristics of applications, specifically targeting
malware and malicious network traffic [96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102]. Other studies proposed
clustering network destination and traffic separately to comprehend some aspect of an application’s
behavior [103], or to generate signatures for computing HTTP packet statistics to improve
detection rates [104]. Other researchers proposed that probabilistic signatures might improve the
detection of information leakage on Android applications [105, 106, 107].
Network traffic modeling. Analysis of applications’ behavior has been used to target malware
or detect bot traffic [108, 109, 110, 111]. Some papers use models of network protocol to
automatically detect bot behavior or protocol vulnerabilities [112] or generate an application’s
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Figure 1.6 Application traffic monitoring and modeling comparison of related work.
information flow and system call sequence graphs to distinguish malware behavior on computers
[113]. Modeling a sequence of ad links on malicious web sites has also been suggested [114]; this
has some similarities to the present proposal.
Information leakage (host). Taint tracking can also accurately detect leakage of sensitive
information and control the information flow of applications [115]. Observation of intent can
be applied to finding malicious activity in applications’ communication [116]. These approaches
have shown that dynamic analysis of the traced details of applications’ behavior on the Android
framework can ameliorate the problem, and it has the advantage of having low overhead with very
few false positives.
Application capability. To address information leakage in applications, fine-grained access
control techniques have been proposed [117, 118]. These projects implement enhancements to
the Android permission policy. Studies have suggested enhancements to the Android permission
framework, and new policies that which would limit applications’ behavior [119, 120, 121, 122].
Separating ad modules from applications can reduce the privacy risk [58, 59, 123] and alert users
to details regarding permissions usage [124]. If permissions are not granted to the advertisement
module, the user can be sure that the advertisement module does not access sensitive information
on the device and send it over the network. These approaches are practical countermeasures against
information leakage, but they all require Android framework modifications or application support.
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Table 1.16 Application traffic monitoring feature comparison (✓is supported; △ is partially
supported).
Feature TaintDroid [115] AdSplit [59] AdRisk [55] Proposed mechanisms
Excessive permission application ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Host information leakage ✓
Network information leakage ✓
Host suspicious library ✓ ✓ ✓
Network suspicious library △ ✓
Privacy preserving. Privacy preserving advertisement approaches [125, 126], in which users’
behavioral information is not collected from devices for targeted advertising, have also been
proposed. Although these proposals reduce users’ privacy risks, they are not in practical use.
Suspicious library (static analysis). Several studies have analyzed the security and privacy
concerns of potentially sensitive information leakage from Android and iOS applications from
suspicious ad module behavior [31, 54, 127, 128, 129]. Some work has focused on ad modules’
access to device identification number and location information, and their ability to send raw
or hashed sensitive information over the network [56]. Such studies have included tracking the
device identification number when it appears in network traffic by analyzing over 100 ad modules
in applications (AdRisk) [55] and observing the number of permissions that are required by ad
modules [130].
The summarized of comparison between related works and the proposed mechanisms from
analyzing method and points of information leakage detection (Figure 1.6). The proposed
mechanisms generating signatures and graph of ad module traffic that can identify sensitive packets
and actual ad module traffic with a small percentage of false positives, does not require any
modifications to the Android framework, or any escalation of user privilege on the Android device,
making the system simple and immediately applicable. It can also be used in conjunction with
other methods should the proposed modifications be implemented, or with anti-virus applications
designed to detect malware.
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Table 1.17 Solving problems in multi-layer security in this dissertation.
Problem Number
Detection of kernel memory corruption Problem 1
Detection of information leakage network traffic Problem 2
Detection of suspicious application library leads information leakage Problem 3
Comparison with Related Work
Table 1.16 compares the security features of the proposed mechanisms to those of three existing
mechanisms [55, 59, 115].
The TaintDroid [115] and AdSplit [55] approaches require Android framework modifications.
AdRisk [59] attempts to identify ad modules within applications. These methods disassemble
the application, or track information flow on the device. The proposed mechanisms use only
the network traffic relationships to detect ad modules’ activity and is thus applicable even in
environments that do not allow static analysis (e.g., the large quantities of data in corporate or
WiFi networks). Additionally, while there are a small number of major ad service providers, many
smaller providers are unlikely to be detected by static analysis. However, the experiments indicate
that manually identified ad graphs are similar to known ad graphs, and thus previously unknown
modules could be detected by the proposed mechanisms using only a few known ad graphs.
1.6 Research Strategies
This section presents the research strategy in the dissertation. Target problems are summarized
in Table 1.17 and Figure 1.7. It mentioned in section 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and approaches in the research.
1.6.1 Detection of Kernel Memory Corruption
This dissertation describes the design of a novel security mechanism called the “kernel memory
observer” (KMO). The proposed mechanism can identify illegal data manipulation in the kernel
virtual memory, which could result in the security features being defeated. KMO provides a secret
observation mechanism that equips an alternative kernel virtual memory as a secret monitor of the
original kernel virtual memory. Although the kernel has one kernel virtual memory at the KPTI
implementation, the design of KMO is such that the kernel virtual memory is completely separated
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Figure 1.7 Approach of this study to the problems of multi-layer security.
to maintain its secrecy, and it is responsible for kernel monitoring, code execution, and valid data
storage.
More specifically, KMO controls a virtual memory switching function that changes the kernel
virtual memory space to the secret virtual memory space at various times during monitoring. KMO
aims to prevent two scenarios: (i) malicious parameters at system call arguments that induce the
injection of suspicious code targeting kernel vulnerabilities; (ii) a kernel vulnerability attack that
overwrites the kernel virtual memory, leading to a modification of KMOmonitoring code and valid
data. KMO can successfully identify kernel virtual memory corruption.
1.6.2 Detection of Information Leakage Network Traffic
Various methods employing tracking-information flow and privilege separation have been used
to address the problem of detecting information leakage network traffic [58, 59, 115, 120, 131].
While these approaches all successfully expose leaks of sensitive information, they all require
extensive modifications to the Android framework. It should be sufficient to force applications to
notify users of information usage details, thus enabling them to control the handling of sensitive
information dynamically. One goal of the present work is to find a practical method, requiring
no modification of the Android framework, which can identify when applications leak sensitive
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information. Another is to create a system where users can easily manage the transmission of
sensitive information by applications, thus reducing possible violations of their privacy.
More specifically, a novel method of clustering is presented, which uses selected HTTP packets
to generate signatures that can accurately identify new packets containing sensitive information.
The primary concern is not malware, but free applications that risk leaking sensitive information.
Additionally, a system that can protect against information leakage (without Android modification)
by generating signatures from applications’ network traffic has also been proposed in a second
research strategy.
1.6.3 Detection of Suspicious Application Library Leads Information
Leakage
Ad modules are developed worldwide and have a variety of implementations. In order to
determine what kind of ad module is included in an application, the proposed approach must
be founded on an accurate comprehension of the behavior of ad modules. Static analysis of
applications is the most efficient approach to this and has been widely used in ad module detection
[55]. Dynamic analysis, which targets real-time behavior of the application’s API calls and
network traffic, is also important. With access to all the data from a corporate or WiFi network,
analyzing only the network traffic should be possible in practice.
More specifically, a novel method is presented for detecting ad module network traffic
intermixed with other application network traffic. The proposed approach is effective in the
practical situation where only network traffic (e.g., from a corporate or WiFi network) can be
monitored. In the proposed approach, a graph of ad module network traffic, extracted from
identifying patterns for each HTTP session, is generated first. For example, ad modules often
download an ad image using a particular sequence of HTML or JavaScript requests. This
representative ad module graph can be compared, using graph distance, to the current network
traffic. Graph distance measures the similarity between any two graphs, so the proposed approach
can use the distance between the current and ad module graphs to determine whether network
traffic is generated by the ad module or not.
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1.7 Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 proposes a security architecture that provides a secret virtual memory to monitor
the kernel virtual memory. The details of the design, its implementation, and the results of the
evaluation are shown.
Chapter 3 proposes a clustering-based signature generation method, which uses selected HTTP
packets to identify new HTTP packets containing sensitive information. The results of the
evaluation are shown.
Chapter 4 proposes a detection method for ad module network traffic intermixed with application
network traffic. This can be used to determine whether or not network traffic is generated by the
ad module. The results of the evaluation are shown.
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of this research, and it indicates the direction of future
problems and research in this field.
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Chapter 2
Detecting and Identifying Kernel Memory
Corruption
2.1 Introduction
Kernel Memory Observer (KMO) prevents the modification of the secret virtual memory and
monitors valid data in the direct mapping region, which contains physical memory for effective
allocation or collection. KMO forces the unmapping of the virtual memory region and relates
KMO information from the direct mapping onto the kernel virtual memory.
In the evaluation, KMO was able to detect the eBPF kernel vulnerability [44], the prototype
of illegal kernel modules that corrupt the kernel virtual memory to bypass the SELinux security
feature. In addition, KMO has a low overhead for each system call round time and for application
running cost.
The main contributions of this study is summarized below:
• Designing a cutting edge security architecture, KMO, that provides a secret virtual memory
to monitor the kernel virtual memory. KMO has a secret observation mechanism that
provides three switching patterns between the secret virtual memory and the kernel
virtual memory, whereas the unmapping method provides protection from direct mapping.
Although kernel protection is being examined in multiple studies, no study has addressed
the monitoring of kernel virtual memory at the kernel level. KMO provides the advantage
of enhanced safety for the kernel, thereby combining the features of existing security
mechanisms without virtualization. Moreover, it can be applied to the OS on a bare machine
and to a guest OS on a cloud environment.
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Figure 2.1 Multiple page table converts virtual address into physical address.
• Implement of KMO on the latest Linux kernel with KPTI. For the evaluation, examined
KMO detection capability with regard to eBPF kernel vulnerability [44] and the prototype of
illegal kernel modules that corrupt the kernel virtual memory to bypass the SELinux security
feature. Additionally, KMO protects monitoring code and information from invalid access
via the direct mapping region. The evaluation results for KMO revealed that its overhead is
from 0.002 µs to 8.246 µs for each system call round time, whereas the application overhead
is from 39.70 µs to 390.52 µs for each switching pattern for 100,000 HTTP accesses.
KMO adopts the PCID of tag-based Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs) to mitigate these
overheads and improve performance.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Virtual Memory Management
Virtual memory is an illusion that provides domestic memory and memory isolation to running
processes. It provides massive memory space on the kernel as compared to the physical memory
space. Figure 2.1 shows that Linux x86 64 allows each process to have its own virtual memory
space. A multiple page table converts virtual addresses into physical addresses on the virtual
memory space. CR3 has a physical address of the page table of the current process, which refers to
a traversal of the page table on the Memory Management Unit (MMU) and cache hit on the TLB.
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Figure 2.2 Overview of monitoring on the secret virtual memory space.
The virtual memory space layout and virtual address length differ for each CPU architecture.
Linux x86 64 has a 48-bit virtual address length, which implies that the virtual address space has
a size of 256 TB. The user space is 128 TB, and the kernel space is 128 TB, which contains the
kernel function, data, module, direct mapping, and memory allocation address space (vmalloc,
etc.).
2.2.2 Separation of Virtual Memory
Kernel and user processes share virtual memory to enable high-speed management. Virtual
memory access control relies on the protection of the privilege level in the kernel and the CPU,
which restricts cross access between the user and kernel modes. A meltdown attack overcomes
this protection, and a user process can then easily access the kernel virtual memory through a
combination of out-of-order, exception, and cache latency on side channel attacks.
One meltdown attack countermeasure involves the separation of the virtual memory used for the
kernel and user modes. Here, a process has two virtual memory spaces. The OS automatically
changes the virtual memory during any privilege level transition from user mode to kernel mode.
The user mode virtual memory only contains a small amount of kernel code that switches to the
virtual memory to minimize the access range of any meltdown attack. KPTI [40] is the separation
method for Linux, and the other OSs are equipped with similar mechanisms [132].
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Figure 2.3 Virtual memory switching patterns 1, 2, and 3
2.3 KMO Design
Figure 2.2 shows that designed “Kernel Memory Observer” (KMO) that creates a secret virtual
memory in the kernel mode. This supports the execution of monitor code in the kernel virtual
memory. It is established at a different location of the kernel virtual memory management from
the latest kernel (e.g., Linux with KPTI). In the KMO’s kernel, it has two kernel virtual memories
(i.e., original and secret).
2.3.1 Design Goal
The goal of KMO is to protect the kernel security feature code, data, and kernel module on the
kernel virtual memory; then, KMO monitors these memory regions to detect invalid overwriting.
The kernel virtual memory permits reading, writing, and execution in the kernel mode, but not
in the user mode. latest kernel (e.g., Linux with KPTI), which enables the isolation of virtual
memories, involves the user and the kernel virtual memory for a process. Whenever a process
invokes a system call processing, the kernel automatically switches both virtual memories during
privilege transitions between the user mode and kernel modes. All processes share the kernel
virtual memory; therefore, the kernel still provides one virtual memory space that is available for
the various features at the kernel layer. Kernel memory corruption vulnerability can potentially
Division of Industrial Innovation Sciences
Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology
Chapter 2 Detecting and Identifying Kernel Memory Corruption 30
lead to invalid overwriting of specific kernel virtual memory region occurs only when the kernel
code is running in kernel mode.
KMO creates a secret virtual memory space isolated from the original kernel virtual memory.
This separation ensures that access violation is impossible between the secret and the original
kernel virtual memory. KMO places the valid monitoring data and the monitoring code on the
secret virtual memory, which is unaffected by the memory corruption on the kernel virtual memory.
KMO generates the valid monitoring data from an original benign kernel code and data at the kernel
boot. KMO then executes the monitoring code on the secret virtual memory. It verifies the kernel
code and data for modification by comparing them with the valid monitoring data.
2.3.2 Switching Patterns and Detection Capability
Figure 2.3 denotes that KMO is a monitoring mechanism that adopts three virtual memory
switching patterns depending on the kernel manages process transition between the user and kernel
modes.
Pattern 1: Inspection point is undertaken before the system call execution. Pattern 1 involves
inspecting whether the system call argument is suspicious data input before the adversary
can execute malicious code by using the kernel vulnerability.
Pattern 2: Inspection points during system call function or kernel code processing. Pattern 2
inspects the kernel code and data in the kernel virtual memory. There may be inspection
points having multiple functions during a system call consisting of multiple functions.
Pattern 2 involves the direct detection of memory corruption in the kernel virtual memory
for any timing during the kernel function flow.
Pattern 3: Inspection point is undertaken after the system call execution. Pattern 3 inspects the
kernel code and data in the kernel virtual memory. It reliably detects memory corruption
after an attack completes a system call execution.
Therefore, KMO automatically switches from every pattern for system call invocation at the
kernel layer. It combines multiple inspection point of patterns at one system call invocation.
Although it is effective in detecting kernel memory corruption and attacks, the number of
inspections results in a significant overhead. Examination of simulated attacks on KMO
mechanism to identify suitable inspection points in a running system.
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Upon identifying the attack, the kernel handles the interruption of system calls by returning
the error number to the user process. Additionally, the kernel is considered available to fix the
modified memory region.
2.3.3 Design Approach
KMO overcomes three challenges facing the monitoring of kernel virtual memory in kernel
mode.
Challenge 1: The monitoring code has access permission for monitored data and will be
executed in the secret virtual memory. KMO has three virtual memory switching
patterns with different inspection points on a running kernel with system calls. The
inspection timing at which memory corruption is detected is also differs for each
switching pattern. It efficiently monitors the already implemented kernel security
feature and the module space in the kernel virtual memory to detect memory corruption
attacks.
For virtual memory switching, KMO writes the physical address of the multiple-page
table of the secret virtual memory into a specific register (i.e., CR3 register points to
the page table for x86 64). The monitoring code executes in the secret virtual memory
space. After monitoring, the KMO writes the physical address of the original kernel
virtual memory into a specific register (i.e., the CR3 register for x86 64), and then
continues the processing of the kernel code before the switching event occurs.
Challenge 2: The kernel code cannot access the secret virtual memory space.
KMO fully copies the secret memory space from the original one such that both
memory spaces contain the same kernel code, kernel data, monitoring code, and
monitoring data.
The monitoring code and valid monitoring data are not accessed through the page table
flag management for the original kernel virtual memory. Therefore, in kernel mode,
the original and secret virtual memory are completely isolated in KMO, ensuring that
the kernel code acts on the original kernel virtual memory space by using its virtual
addresses. Furthermore, it ensures that the monitored kernel code cannot access the
kernel mode secret virtual memory space.
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Figure 2.4 Overview of secret virtual memory space for Linux kernel.
Challenge 3: The monitoring code and valid data are not affected through a direct mapping
space. The kernel virtual memory management provides a direct mapping space
containing the physical memory for effective page-based memory allocation and
collection. KMO shares the physical memory between the kernel and the secret virtual
memory, which can be abused by allowing direct access to the monitoring code and
valid data KMO modifies the allocation mechanism of direct mapping to prevent
memory corruption via the direct mapping space. To exclude the monitoring code
and valid data from the direct mapping of the kernel virtual memory, KMO forces the
unmapping of these in the kernel virtual memory.
2.4 KMO Implementation
Implementation of KMO is on Linux as the target OS and x86 64 as the CPU architecture.
2.4.1 Secret Virtual Memory Space Management
KMO can monitor the kernel virtual memory (Figure 2.4). The latest Linux kernel has the KPTI
feature, which already provides each process has 2 virtual memory spaces.
For the kernel, the pgd variable of init_mm in mm_struct points to the physical memory
address of the kernel virtual memory. KMO creates an additional virtual memory space on the
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Figure 2.5 Virtual memory space switching on Linux kernel.
kernel whose physical address is a 4 page (16 KB on x86 64) logical conjunction from the physical
address of the pgd variable of init_mm. Moreover, the kernel code and data are duplicated from
the pgd variable. KMO uses the physical address of the created virtual memory to switch from the
kernel virtual memory to the monitoring of each process in the kernel mode.
2.4.2 Switching of the Virtual Memory Space
Implementation of KMO is to provide a virtual memory switching mechanism for the secret
virtual memory space in kernel mode (Figure 2.5).
In user mode, Interrupt (SYSCALL, IRQ) and Exception are triggered for the transition to
kernel mode. It calls the SWITCH KPTI CR3 function on the virtual memory of the user and
then changes to the kernel virtual memory space.
In kernel mode, KMO fulfills challenge 1, as the kernel calls the SWITCH KMO CR3 function,
which calculates a 4-page offset to the physical address of the secret virtual memory space
from the pgd variable of init_mm. The kernel writes this value to the CR3 register, followed
by automatically switching the virtual memory space for monitoring. After the monitoring
process, the SWITCH KMO CR3 function writes the physical address of the pgd variable in the
active_mm of the current (task_struct) variable to the CR3 register, which can change the
virtual memory space for the currently running process in kernel mode. The kernel then calls
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Figure 2.6 Position and unmap region for the virtual memory space on Linux x86 64.
SWITCH KPTI CR3 to change the virtual memory space for the user, and the system changes to
user mode via an interrupt (SYSRET Interrupt return) or exception (Exception exit).
KMO currently supports the Process Context ID (PCID) during CR3 register writing. It enables
the cache of TLB entry (lower 12 bits of CR3 value) by using the conversion of caches between
the virtual and physical addresses on the specific CPU. If the CPU or environment does not
support PCID, KMO uses TLB flush after the CR3 register writing. However, the virtual address
conversion is accompanied by overheads.
2.4.3 Monitoring of Virtual Memory Space
KMO has almost the same virtual memory space layout both original and secret virtual memory
on Linux x86 64 (Figure 2.6). KMO monitors the security_hook_list variable for LSM on
the kernel text mapping and the module list variable modules in the kernel virtual memory.
Additionally, KMO disables Copy on Write of the monitored data, whereas it supports targeted
kernel space reading after virtual memory switching occurs. KMO fulfills challenge 2 as both the
monitoring code and the valid monitoring data have a designated flag setting that does not accept
reading and writing at the supervisor level on the Page Table Entry.
KMO keeps the secret virtual memory space in the kernel boot sequence and then starts the
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Figure 2.7 Monitoring attacker process using the secret virtual memory space on Linux.
monitoring feature according to the following sequence.
(1) The mm_init function initializes the kernel virtual memory, whereas the kaiser_init of
KPTI function initializes the virtual memory for the user on the kernel boot sequence.
(2) KMO initializes the secret virtual memory in physical memory.
(3) The security_init function initializes the LSM and MAC mechanism.
(4) The load_default_modules function executes the module reading process on the kernel.
(5) KMO duplicates the valid monitoring data between the secret and kernel virtual memory
spaces.
(6) KMO starts the monitoring feature in the secret virtual memory space.
2.4.4 Direct Mapping Management
Linux 4.4 (x86 64) has a direct mapping space of 64 TB. Therefore, the machine physical
memory is mapped to a space of less than 64 TB, and the kernel manages physical page allocation
by using direct mapping. Thus, it is possible to access the kernel code and the data virtual and
direct mapping virtual addresses.
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Linux uses the init_mem_mapping function to create the virtual memory direct mapping space.
The kernel_physical_mapping_init function then maps the physical addresses to virtual
memory. KMO covers challenge 3, as KMO uses the remove_pagetable function to unmap
secret pages of the monitoring code and valid monitoring data from the direct mapping space in
the kernel virtual memory after establishing a secret virtual memory setup (Figure 2.6). Any access
to the unmapped pages occurs through a page fault. Subsequently, KMO registers an original page
fault handler of unmapped memory region for panic processing.
2.4.5 Kernel Vulnerability Attacking Case
In one of the memory corruption kernel vulnerability cases, the adversary uses the eBPF
vulnerability[44] to modify the targeted data on the kernel virtual memory. The adversary
finally takes the shell as the root capability without any LSM limitation after memory corruption
overrides the SELinux function pointer, as well as credential information. KMO monitors these
modifications and detects the following sequences (Figure 2.7):
(1) The adversary executes the PoC code of the eBPF vulnerability with the user privilege. The
PoC code inserts malicious BPF code into the kernel virtual memory via the sys_bpf system
call. Although KMO traps the system calls, this does not lead to suspicious behavior at the
time.
(2) The adversary overwrites the LSM function pointer and performs privilege escalation
through memory corruption via the sys_bpf system call at the kernel mode. KMO also traps
the issued system calls. The KMO’s Pattern 2 monitoring identifies the LSM function pointer
modification on the kernel control flow. It compares the security_hook_list variable
with the monitoring data containing valid data and determines whether the monitored data
is invalid. If the KMO’s Pattern 2 is not invoked at kernel, KMO’s Pattern 3 also traps it and
identifies the same malicious behavior after the eBPF system call execution.
(3) The adversary launches the shell program from the PoC code. In KMO’s Pattern 1, it traps
the sys_exec system call and then determines whether it constitutes malicious behavior.
System call arguments contain the shell program name, and memory corruption is already
identified upon modification of the variable security_hook_list.
Division of Industrial Innovation Sciences
Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology
Chapter 2 Detecting and Identifying Kernel Memory Corruption 37
2.5 Evaluation
2.5.1 Evaluation Purpose and Environment
Evaluation of KMO’s effectiveness in term of detection capability and overhead. The evaluation
items and objectives are described below:
E1: Monitoring system call argument experiment
Evaluation of switching Pattern 1 of KMO to verify whether the target system call argument
is valid before system call execution.
E2: Detection of overwriting of LSM function
Assessment of switching Patterns 2 and 3 of KMO to check whether or not they correctly
identify an eBPF vulnerability PoC that modifies the LSM function’s virtual address.
Determining of the timing at which the attacks on the kernel virtual memory are detected.
E3: Evaluation of the prevention of access to direct mapping
Examined whether KMO prevents access to valid monitoring data in the direct mapping space
after KMO unmaps secret pages.
E4: Measurement of overhead of system call interaction with KMO
Monitoring of the effect of kernel availability with KMO by switching the virtual memory
space. The measurement of the overhead by benchmark software to calculate the system call
latency.
E5: Measurement of the overhead of application with KMO
Measurement of the performance overhead of a user process by using benchmark software on
KMO, which adopts several virtual memory switching patterns.
Evaluation of KMO on a physical machine with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7700HQ (2.80 GHz,
x86 64) and 16 GB DDR4 memory. The implementation targeted Linux Kernel 4.4.114 on
Debian 9.0. 17 source files are modified regarding alternative virtual memory, virtual memory
switching and monitoring functions, which required 1,653 lines in the Linux kernel. eBPF kernel
vulnerability [44] PoC is customized for the modification of any virtual address on the kernel
virtual memory. Of the evaluations E4 and E5, the comparison of the vanilla kernel with PCID
(K0), KMO kernel without PCID (K1), and KMO kernel with PCID (K2). K0 supports TLB
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Figure 2.8 Monitoring result for Linux system call arguments.
caches for user and kernel virtual memory. Although K1 does not enable a TLB cache of secret
virtual memory, K2 pushes user, kernel, and secret virtual memory into TLB cache mechanism.
2.5.2 Monitoring System Call Argument
Assumption of rootkit installation. KMO monitors the module installation mechanism that uses
the init_module and finit_module system calls. It inspects the kernel module binary image
from the system call argument and then outputs whether the module is invalid as the detection
result. In the log message, switching Pattern 1 denotes the monitoring system call as “target
system call” and the invalid module as “invalid module name”.
KMO correctly identifies the invalid kernel from the system call argument (Figure 2.8). The
monitoring function detects invalid module names via the module binary for only 0.05 ms before
the kernel executes the system call and then invokes the module initial function.
Confirmation of switching Pattern 1 yields the correct evaluation results for the monitoring and
inspection of the system call argument. Although the module executes its initialization function,
the module installation process is not yet completed at the time of detection in Patterns 1. This
indicates that KMO interrupts the kernel code, specifically the system call invocation mechanism
to determine if the validation is possible before system call processing.
2.5.3 Detection of Linux Security Module Overwrite
The original kernel module that replaces the LSM hook function. The custom eBPF vulnerability
PoC forces the exchange of one LSM hook function in the selinux hooks variable to the kernel
module function on the kernel virtual memory. KMO stores the valid data at kernel boot. It then
automatically identifies this memory corruption on switching patterns 2 and 3. These patterns
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Figure 2.9 Monitoring result for LSM function
Figure 2.10 Preventing result for modification through direct mapping.
compare the target LSM hook function’s virtual address with the valid monitoring data, and then
outputs the result as a log message. An invalid case is denoted by “Invalid lsm function is detected”
and “Virtual Address (Invalid)” in the detection.
KMO’s detection result is successful on Patterns 2 and 3 (Figure 2.9). Patterns 2 and 3 determine
whether the illegal memory is overwritten after the LSM function is modified for detection.
Confirmation of switching patterns 2 and 3 determine the illegal memory corruption at suitable
detection timings. Therefore, KMO has an effective detection capability for kernel vulnerability
against attacks that modify the LSM function’s virtual address to prevent its existence in the kernel
virtual memory.
Division of Industrial Innovation Sciences
Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology
Chapter 2 Detecting and Identifying Kernel Memory Corruption 40
Table 2.1 Overhead of switching virtual memory space and monitoring (µs).
System call Vanilla kernel (K0) KMO kernel Overhead
NO PCID (K1) PCID (K2) K1-K0 K2-K0
fork+/bin/sh 914.900 946.758 925.269 31.858 10.369
fork+execve 260.357 274.589 265.324 14.232 4.967
fork+exit 238.784 255.276 244.128 16.492 5.344
fstat 0.359 0.384 0.377 0.025 0.018
open / close 7.245 7.598 7.293 0.353 0.048
read 0.356 0.358 0.358 0.002 0.002
write 0.309 0.312 0.310 0.003 0.001
stat 2.322 2.408 2.351 0.086 0.029
2.5.4 Evaluation of Direct Mapping Access Validation
Evaluation of KMO when preventing the overriding of valid monitoring data with invalid data
via the direct mapping region in the kernel virtual memory. The KMO unmaps the specific page
of the valid data on direct mapping at kernel boot. Subsequently, the kernel module installation
attempts to write the invalid data and output the result to a log message.
Figure 2.10 shows the log information after the unmapping process. The kernel module
calculates the virtual address on direct mapping from the correct virtual address of the valid data
and then accesses it. Next, the kernel issues the page request for the unmapped page having the
virtual address on direct mapping. Thus, overwriting fails from the kernel module’s write access
via direct mapping.
2.5.5 Measurement System Call Interaction Overhead
Comparison of the Linux kernel, including KMO’s mechanism, with a vanilla Linux kernel to
measure the performance overhead. Adopted benchmark software, lmbench, and execute it 10
times to calculate an average score and determine whether each system call has an overhead effect.
The overhead results are the measurement switching virtual memory features. The results are
the switching of the virtual memory for each system call execution (Table 2.1). lmbench shows
different counts of system calls invoked for each benchmark. fork+/bin/sh has approximately
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Table 2.2 ApacheBench overhead of virtual memory switching and monitoring on the Linux
kernel (µs).
File size (KB) Vanilla kernel (K0) KMO kernel Overhead
NO PCID (K1) PCID (K2) K1-K0 K2-K0
1 1,041.26 1,080.96 1,050.60 39.70 9.34
10 1,878.02 1,962.70 1,895.78 84.68 17.76
100 9,621.70 10,012.22 9,718.02 390.52 96.32
Table 2.3 ApacheBench overhead of virtual memory switching patterns 1 and 3 with monitoring
(µs).
File size (KB) Vanilla kernel (P0) KMO kernel (PCID) Overhead
Pattern 1 (P1) Pattern 3 (P3) P1-P0 P3-P0
1 1,041.26 1,051.89 1,050.01 10.63 8.75
10 1,878.02 1,892.16 1,893.10 14.14 15.08
100 9,621.70 9,711.18 9,678.76 89.48 57.06
54 invocations; fork+execve has 4 invocations; fork+exit has 2 invocations; open / close has 2
invocations; and the others have 1 invocation.
Table 2.1 shows that the overhead of the KMO (NO PCID) and KMO (PCID) versions. In KMO
(NO PCID), the system calls with the highest overheads are fork+exit (8.246 µs) and fork+execve
(3.558 µs). The system calls with lower overheads are read (0.002 µs) and write (0.003 µs). A
kernel with KMO (NO PCID) exhibits an overhead of 0.002 µs to 8.246 µs for each system call
invocation. Otherwise, KMO (PCID) has the highest overheads are fork+exit (2.672 µs), and
fork+execve (1.2417 µs). The system calls with lower overheads are write (0.001 µs) and read
(0.002 µs) improvement. KMO (PCID) exhibits a range of overhead from 0.001 µs to 2.672 µs for
each system call invocation.
The lmbench overhead results indicate that the performance of KMO is affected by the switching
virtual memory and monitoring process cost. The PCID contributes to the context switching of
processes and kernel thread memory access to reduce the overhead of KMO.
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2.5.6 Measurement Application Overhead
The comparison of the application overhead among the vanilla kernel, KMO (NO PCID),
and KMO (PCID) kernels. Additionally, Evaluation of the effect of PCID on both kernels
with switching patterns 1 and 3 Running of Apache 2.4.25 process. The benchmark software
is ApacheBench 2.4. The environment includes a 100-Mbps network, one connection, and
benchmark file sizes of 1 KB, 10 KB, and 100 KB. The ApacheBench calculates one download
request average of 100,000 accesses to each file. The client machine is an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5
4200U (1.6 GHz, two cores), with 8 GB of memory and running Windows 8 as the OS.
The virtual memory switching patterns do not call the monitoring process because the evaluation
measures the performance effect of the kernel on each switching pattern. Comparison of the KMO
(NO PCID) and KMO (PCID) kernels. KMO (NO PCID) switches the virtual memory every
200 system call invocations, whereas KMO (PCID) switches it every 100 system call invocations
(Table 2.2). In KMO (PCID) for Patterns 1 and 3, the monitoring function is called to evaluate the
differences of the two patterns’ overheads for every 100 system call invocations (Table 2.3).
KMO (NO PCID) has an overhead ranging from 39.70 µs to 390.52 µs, and KMO (PCID) has
an overhead from 9.34 µs to 96.32 µs at each HTTP access. Additionally, the KMO (PCID) of
Pattern 1 is from 10.63 µs to 89.48 µs, and that of Pattern 3 is from 8.75 µs to 57.06 µs at each
HTTP access.
The overhead of ApacheBench depends on the total number of system call invocations in the
process. The ApacheBench result shows that Patterns 1 and 3 considerably increase the overhead
factor for a large file. When used on the benchmark, the overhead cost becomes relatively small
at the application processing time. Consideration of Pattern 1 to require an argument inspection of
register transfer cost with a high impact. Pattern 3 incurs the same overhead cost, indicating that
the switching of virtual memory and the memory monitoring have a constant of inspection cost.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Performance Consideration
Consideration of the performance overhead, whereby KMO enables the reduction of the
performance overhead by using tag-based TLBs that provide an Address Space Identifier. The
PCID on x86 is the cache for the virtual address to physical address conversion. The cache on
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TLBs improves physical memory access without a page table walk to identify targeted page after
a CR3 register update. Moreover, mitigation of overhead of KMO (PCID) relies on the number of
TLB cache hits for page accesses while monitoring the secret virtual memory. Additionally, the
Linux KPTI mechanism uses the PCID of TLB. Moreover, KMO (PCID) enables the storage of
KPTI’s caches without a TLB flush to perform a quick virtual memory switch. A virtual machine
feature or cloud service may not provide the PCID of the virtual CPU, and KMO requires the
performance penalty for calling the TLB flush for CR3 register updation in that environment.
Moreover, the application process has no overhead in user mode. Nearly the entire performance
effect involves the switching of the virtual memory, followed by the monitoring feature in kernel
mode. The overhead cost in the system call latency evaluation is identical for all types of system
calls. Estimation of the actual application performance is proportional to the switching virtual
memory and the monitoring process in the kernel mode after system call invocation in user mode.
The monitoring system call has a different cost for the type of system call argument. A string
variable or address information has low overhead, but reading the data from the user mode has
a high overhead. KMO requires nearly the same cost as an actual system call. In addition, the
monitoring function’s cost depends on the monitoring data size. The target kernel code or data
affects the comparison process with the valid data.
2.6.2 KMO Detection Capability
Kernel vulnerabilities that enable privilege escalation have two effect types in the kernel layer.
One type induces memory corruption on the kernel virtual memory (e.g., eBPF vulnerability
[44]), whereas the other type does not create any kernel memory side effects (e.g., Dirty COW
vulnerability [133]). If an adversary attempts to gain full administrator privilege of the OS,
kernel memory corruption vulnerability is high priority to execute on attack scenarios for the
defeating of security features. KMO provides a combination of switching virtual memory patterns
having different inspection timings. Its feature detection capabilities compensate for the memory
corruption of kernel vulnerability attacks for the kernel mode. During the evaluation, the eBPF
vulnerability attack overwrites the SELinux functions’ virtual address of the LSM hook variable
that was automatically detected on KMO for protecting the security features on the kernel
Moreover, KMO identifies an attack code starting point from the user space and kernel space via
using multiple system calls for the prevention of kernel vulnerability attacks leading to memory
corruption. At an actual attack detection point, Pattern 1 determines the attack before system call
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execution on the kernel and prevents memory corruption. Although Pattern 2 identifies memory
corruption, it interrupts the kernel execution flow of multiple functions having one system call.
The user inserts a suitable detection point to reduce the effect of the kernel vulnerability attack.
Preventing the execution of malicious code on one system call invocation for Pattern 3 is difficult
because its checkpoint is just before switching back to the user mode. Therefore, Pattern 3 reliably
detects memory corruption during kernel processing for multiple functions.
2.7 Conclusion
Most kernel vulnerability attacks that focus on kernel virtual memory corruption aim to perform
privilege escalation or defeat security features. The OS kernel should reduce the effect of the
attack on the adoption capability and MAC restrict privileges. Although kernel adopts KASLR,
CFI, KPTI, and SMAP / SMEP of CPU features to prevent kernel vulnerability attacks for memory
corruption occurs privilege escalation or the avoidance of security features, kernel have been
potential to compromise at only kernel layer. The proposed KMO is contributed as follows.
• The KMO provides secret observation mechanism for monitoring of the original kernel
virtual memory. To determine invalid kernel virtual memory overwriting, KMO supports
multiple inspection points, identifies malicious system call arguments, and prevents attacks
through the direct mapping region.
• On the evaluation of Linux with KMO that successes to inspect system call arguments
and identify the memory corruption of security features. The performance overhead from
0.002 µs to 8.246 µs in terms of each system call invocation on KMO kernel. The web
application overhead for KMO monitoring from 39.70 µs to 390.52 µs at the running
process. Additionally, the adoption of PCID on TLB for KMO, which reduces the overhead
requirement of KMO, to adopt the actual load effect for monitoring and virtual memory
switching.
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Chapter 3
Detection of Sensitive Information Leakage
in Android Applications
3.1 Introduction
In many cases, malware is detected by the anti-virus software. Various other methods have been
proposed, such as detecting anomalous traffic generated by malware [96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
102, 103, 104]. However, free software that allows sensitive information leakage is not malware
(and thus is not discovered by anti-virus software) but still presents a threat to the user’s privacy.
Furthermore, sensitive information leakage may show different network patterns than malware, and
thus sensitive information leakage detection in Android applications should be handled separately
from malware detection.
Of evaluation, 1,188 free Android applications are analyzed from the Top 100 and the Recent
Uploads lists in Google Play Japan and collected 107,859 HTTP packets that these applications
generated. Examination of the number of HTTP packets that included sensitive information and
sent it to outside servers using string matching. Considered sensitive information to be unique
device identifiers (UDIDs) (Android ID, IMEI, IMSI and SIM Serial ID), hashed UDIDs (MD5,
SHA1), and carrier names. In this trace, 23,309 HTTP packets contained such information.
Some advertisement modules obfuscate or hide sensitive information in packets. Therefore, string
matching is not sufficient for detecting all information leakage. After sensitive packets had been
identified, the clustering is applied to a sample of the refined data to generate signatures (individual
device is information is, of course, unique to each device, and thus not part of matched string used
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Figure 3.1 Overview of Android architecture
to generate the signature). And re-applied these signatures to the entire dataset. This method
resulted in a high percentage of true positives, and a low percentage of false positives. Thus,
the conclusion indicates that generated signatures have sufficient accuracy for detecting sensitive
information transmissions.
The main contributions is considered following:
• A novel clustering method using HTTP packet distance that identifies the similarity between
the two of Android application network packets.
• A system, using the proposed clustering method followed by signature generation, that can
detect sensitive information leakage without altering the Android framework.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Android Architecture
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the Android architecture, which consists a Linux kernel,
Middleware, Android applications, and sensitive information (Address Book, Location, Mail, and
Phone State are shown). Middleware includes the Binder, the Library framework, and one Dalvik
Virtual Machine (DVM) per application.
The Linux kernel provides some fundamental features for the upper layers: process
management, a file system, and network services. Middleware provides DVMs, which are used
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Table 3.1 Number of applications with dangerous permission combinations. Out of 1,188
applications total, 55% required both the INTERNET permission and at least one permission
for sensitive information.
Internet Location Phone Contacts # Apps
x 302
x x 329
x x x 153
x x 148
x x x x 23
233
run applications. The Binder supports IPC and checks an application’s permission list when it
tries to access sensitive information via the Library. Applications on Android each have a unique
Linux UID and resources have Linux UID specific permissions. This environment paradigm is
called sandboxing. The application can only access resources within the bounds of its privilege
permissions.
3.2.2 Android Permissions
Android provides the permission framework for managing an application’s privileges. In order
to access resources on Android, an application needs a specific set of permissions which link to
these resources. For instance, the INTERNET permission allows an application to connect to any
outside server using network. The READ PHONE STATE permission allows an application to
access the unique device identifier and line number on the device. At the time of writing, there are
151 privileges permissions defined by Android API level 21 [134].
When an application accesses a controlled resource object, the Binder takes charge of the
reference monitor to manage the application’s request. The Binder verifies that the application
has the appropriate permissions to bind to the requested resource.
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3.3 Problem Description
In this section, the explanation that is how particular combinations of application permissions
can allow a violation of user privacy. Analysis of the network traffic of 1,188 free applications –
howmany servers are connected to by an application; what, if any, sensitive information is included
in the traffic – to show that this problem is a practical concern.
3.3.1 Application Request Permissions
Previous studies show that many applications require the INTERNET permission [127]. Table
3.1 shows the permissions held by collected 1,188 applications: 302 applications (25%) require
only the INTERNET permission, while 653 applications (55%) require the INTERNET and
some combination of sensitive information permissions. The consideration of sensitive information
permissions to include LOCATION, READ PHONE STATE, and READ CONTACTS. Those
653 applications can access sensitive resources on the device and send information gathered from
those sensitive resources using the network feature, all without user confirmation, putting the user’s
privacy at risk.
3.3.2 Application Traffic Analysis
In fact, previous researches have been shown that some applications transmit sensitive
information to external servers [31, 54]. One of the main reasons for this is that developers
build an advertisement module into the free version of their applications for revenue. In order
to collect statistical information of the device usage and to provide a targeted advertisement for
users, advertisement modules take advantage of their ability to access sensitive information.
UDIDs are most commonly used by advertisement modules [55]. The types of UDIDs include
the Android ID, the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), the International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and the SIM Serial ID. Additionally, some modules compute UDID’s
hash with a cryptographic hash function at the time of transmission [56]. These UDIDs are
immutable and linked to a user’s real name and bank account. Unlike Internet cookies and IP
addresses, UDIDs are hard (if not impossible) to change or erase, so it can be very dangerous
for a user to have an advertisement module leaking his UDIDs. If an advertisement module
generates a UDID’s hash value from only a UDID, the hash value is same all the time, thus the
Division of Industrial Innovation Sciences
Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology
Chapter 3 Detection of Sensitive Information Leakage in Android Applications 49
user cannot change the UDID’s hash value without changing the original UDID, so the hash values
have similar security problems. An advertisement module should use an application’s unique
user ID value (e.g., UUID value) rather than its UDID. If UUIDs (which are mutable) were used
instead of UDIDs, harvested information would be restricted to the transmitting application, and
the user would have the ability to alter his device’s ID if he were concerned by the accumulation
of information.
Selected 1,188 free applications from the popular ranking in Japan’s Google Play from January
to April, 2012. Since many users choose their applications from this ranking, consideration of this
to be a good sample of applications used in Japan. Investigated the network traffic generated by
these applications. The applications sent 107,859 GET / POST HTTP packets. The experiment
environment was a Nexus S, Android 2.3.6.
Table 3.2 shows the number of HTTP packets destined for the most common hosts and the
number of applications that send to each destination domain. Note that many applications send
HTTP packets to the same destinations, and that some of these domains, such as “admob.com”
and “ad-maker.info”, are clearly advertisement services. Other domains are Web API service
providers. Many of investigated applications send information to advertisement servers. During
this experiment that several applications have multiple advertisement modules (e.g., AdMob,
AdMaker, Adlantis, and MicroAd). Suspecting of applications switch from one module to another,
depending on the user’s device environment, such as country or carrier, to improve the revenue.
Figure 3.2 shows the cumulative frequency distribution of HTTP host destinations of
investigated applications. From this, confirmed most of the targeted applications connect to
multiple servers. From examination of the HTTP host destinations, 81 applications (7%) have
1 destination, 885 applications (74%) have up to 10 destinations, and 1,006 (90%) application
have up to 16 destinations. The average number of destinations was 7.9. One application included
an embedded browser, and thus had the largest number of destinations at 84.
Table 3.3 shows the number of HTTP packets, applications, and HTTP host destinations that are
touched by sensitive information, where sensitive information is considered to be: UDIDs (IMEI,
IMSI, SIM Serial ID, and Android ID), UDIDs’ hashed values, and carrier name. IMEI refers
to the assigned device number, IMSI to the assigned telephone service subscriber number in the
SIM card, SIM Serial ID to the assigned SIM card number, and the Android ID to the assigned
Android instance number, which is generated at Android’s initial boot. The Android ID is the
most frequently used identifier. Many examples of sensitive information being sent to the same
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Figure 3.2 Frequency Distribution of HTTP Host Destinations. Out of 1,188 applications total, 81
(7%) have 1 destination, 885 (74%) have up to 10 destinations, and average number of destinations
was 7.9.
destination. For example: “ad-maker.info”, “mydas.mobi”, “medibaad.com”, and “adlantis.jp”
expect IMEI and Android ID; “zqapk.com” expects IMEI, SIM Serial ID, and carrier name; and
“googlesyndication.com” and “admob.com” expect only Android ID.
From these results, the user’s sensitive information is accessed by applications which send it
to outside servers via the network. Since Android does not provide the usage history of runtime
applications’ permissions, the users cannot observe the application’s network behavior, and thus
cannot prevent the sensitive information leakage.
3.4 Approach
Presented the following HTTP packet clustering and signature generation methods to address
the problem described in Section 4.3. The objective of proposed approach is to without an
Android framework modification, detect suspicious network behavior, specifically the transmission
of sensitive information by an application to an outside server. Additionally, proposed system
should be practical and lightweight for users to apply. Ideally, users would install the application
component of proposed system to handle all the network transmissions generated by other
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Figure 3.3 (a) The architecture of proposed clustering and signature generation system. (b) The
information flow control application that uses the signatures generated by (a).
applications. Proposed approach is to collect network traffic and generate signatures from the
clustering of the traffic. If sensitive information is sent unencrypted over the network, it is a fairly
simple matter to detect such transmission, and signature generation can help to counteract leakage
even when sensitive information is nondeterministically altered or obfuscated by an application’s
Software Development Kit (SDK) such as the Apperhand [135]) which is an advertisement SDK
acted unwanted behavior for user. It is also effective against encrypted traffic that uses the same
encryption key over a variety of modules or applies a cryptographic hash function to sensitive
information.
3.4.1 Overview
Figure 3.3 shows proposed approach, which consists of two parts. First, a separate server (shown
in Figure 3.3a) collects application traffic, clusters the data, and generates signatures. Second, an
information flow control application on the user’s device (shown in Figure 3.3b) fetches signatures
from the server and manages the transmission of other applications’ network traffic.
The server generates signatures by the following process. First, it performs a payload check,
which separates application network traffic into two groups: one containing packets with sensitive
information, and the other not. Second, the server clusters the group containing sensitive
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information based on packet destination distance and content distance. Finally, it constructs
a set of signatures from the clustering result using conjunction signatures [105], then sifts out
overly general signatures and the actual sensitive information values, which assumption is to
be device or advertisement service provider specific, and thus not useful for identifying future
leakage. The screening process is most effective when the seed packets contain accurate patterns
of sensitive information leakage, and proposed clustering and signature choices reflect that. Using
the HTTP packet distance emphasizes patterns in HTTP packets, allowing us to distinguish trends
and distributions of HTTP packets. Thus a packet with sensitive information will be clustered with
other packets containing the same sensitive information, generating a useful signature. For that
reason, definition of distance to include both packet content and packet destination. This broader
definition causes packets sent to the same server to be clustered together, creating advertisement
module specific signatures.
The information flow control application inspects network traffic using the Android API
VpnService on Android 4.0 and later, which does not require any special privileges. On Android
2.3 special privileges for iptables are required for packet inspection.
3.4.2 HTTP Packet Destination Distance
The HTTP packet destination distances are calculated by the packets’ destination IP addresses,
port numbers, and HTTP host domains. Given two HTTP packets px and py, definition of the
HTTP packet destination distance to be:
ddst(px, py) = dip(px, py) + dport(px, py) + dhost(px, py).
Let HTTP packet pn destination be defined as pn = {ipn, portn, hostn}, where ipn is a destination
IPv4 address, portn is the port number, hostn is HTTP host. The distance in the above equation is
defined as follows:
• Destination IP Address Distance: The distance between destination IP addresses’ high bit
is the longest matching prefix of the binary representations. IPv4 addresses have a 232 bit
space, and IP address blocks are denoted approximately by the upper 8 bit range. IP address
blocks are allocated to organizations by the National Internet Registry and if the upper bits
of IP addresses match on separate packets, there is a high possibility that the two destinations
are managed by the same organization. Therefore, definition of the destination IP address
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distance on packets px, py as
dip(px, py) = lmatch(ipx, ipy)/32 ∈ [0, 1]
where lmatch is a function returns a number of common upper bits in two IP address.
• Port Number Distance: The distance between port numbers is a Boolean: matching or not.
Port numbers have a 216 bit space, and usually specific port number is reserved for services.
Definition of the port number distance on packets px, py as
dport(px, py) = match(portx, porty) ∈ {0, 1}
where match is a function returns 1 on matching ports, and 0 on different ports.
• HTTP Host Distance: definition of the HTTP host as the character string of the Fully
Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). Thus, the distance between HTTP host domains can be
computed using the generality method to determine their edit distance. Definition the HTTP
Host distance on packets px, py as
dhost(px, py) =
ed(hostx, hosty)
max(len(hostx), len(hosty))
∈ [0, 1]
where ed is a function which returns an edit distance result, len is a function which returns
a length of character strings, and max is a function which returns the greater of its two input
values.
3.4.3 HTTP Packet Content Distance
The HTTP packet content distance is computed using the request-line, cookie, and
message-body fields of the HTTP header. Given two HTTP packets px and py, definition of the
HTTP content distance dheader(px, py) as
dheader(px, py) = drline(px, py) + dcookie(px, py) + dbody(px, py).
Let HTTP packet pn contents be defined as pn = {rlinen, cookien, bodyn}, where rlinen is
request-line, cookien is cookie, bodyn is message-body. These contents are character or binary
strings. In order to accurately compute a distance, the applying of the normalized compression
distance (NCD) algorithm [136], which is based on Kolmogorov’s complexity, to calculate the
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closeness of two strings without any context dependency. The NCD of any two character strings is
defined as
ncd(x, y) =
C(xy) − min(C(x),C(y))
max(C(x),C(y))
where C(x) is a function which compresses a character string x, then returns its length. Definition
of the distance between content components of HTTP packets px, py as
ddata(px, py) = ncd(datax, datay) ∈ [0, 1]
where data corresponds to request-line, cookie, and message-body respectively. After each data
has been computed, they are combined into the overall distance.
3.4.4 Hierarchical Clustering
Hierarchical clustering uses group averages for iterative calculation and computes the proximity
of clusters with HTTP packet distance (HTTP packet destination distance and HTTP packet content
distance) as a heuristic. It then assigns a cluster to each HTTP packet, and iteratively composes
new clusters from the nearest distance of HTTP packet pairs until there is only one cluster. Given
two HTTP packets px and py, definition of the HTTP packet distance as
dpkt(px, py) = ddst(px, py) + dheader(px, py)
using the formula from sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 to compute ddst and dheader. Given two clusters Cx
and Cy, group average distance is defined as
dgroup(Cx,Cy) =
1
|Cx||Cy|
∑
px∈Cx
∑
py∈Cy
dpkt(px, py).
In a dataset of N HTTP packets H = {pi}i=1..N , hierarchical clustering is applied to a subset P of
size M: P j, j=1..M ⊂ H, using the following method:
(1) Assign each HTTP packet pk ∈ P to cluster Ck. At the end of this step, C = {Ck}k=1..M is the
set of defined clusters.
(2) Chose any cluster Cx ∈ C, and compute the distance to all other clusters Cy,y=1..M ∈ C, x , y
using the cluster distance dgroup.
(3) Select the cluster Cy that is the closest to Cx. Create a new cluster Cz = {Cx,Cy} and add it
to C, then remove Cx and Cy.
(4) Repeat until C has one cluster.
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3.4.5 Signature Generation
The generating of a conjunction signature set from the hierarchical clustering result, which
is a dendrogram of the HTTP packet group. A conjunction signature set contains the invariant
tokens that describe the longest common substrings (LCS) in the dendrogram. Signatures each
represent a feature of the cluster. That is, they reflect sensitive information as an invariant token.
Given a dataset of N HTTP packets H = {pi}i=1..N and a subset P j, j=1..M ⊂ H used to generate
(as described in Section 3.4.4) dendrogram C, which has the nesting structure characteristic of
clusters, generating of the conjunction signature set using the following process:
(1) Select the top of cluster Ci ∈ C.
(2) Compute a signature S i as LCS of HTTP contents in Ci.
(3) Remove Ci from C and repeat for all clusters in C.
3.4.6 Signature Screening
A conjunction signature set contains many general signatures such as POST, GET, HTTP/1.1
which match most network packets. Proposed system screens signature candidates by checking
whether a candidate determines most non-sensitive packets to be sensitive. Such signatures are
considered too general and are removed from the conjunction signature set. If the signatures
are not screened in this manner, proposed system blocks almost all applications’ network traffic.
Additionally, proposed system screens for patterns of UDIDs and hashed UDIDs from the
conjunction signature set. Since different each devices generally have different UDIDs, these
signatures are not useful when detecting network traffic.
3.5 Evaluation
3.5.1 Experimental Setup
Collection of network traffic is from 1,188 free applications running on an Android 2.3.6,
Nexus S, from January to April, 2012. The application set was as described in Section 4.3.
Each application was run manually for 5 to 15 minutes on the device. Attempting is to test
every possible application function. Generated the network traffic manually, since it is difficult
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to automatically test an application that requires user interaction such as entering passwords and
other user identification, or correct screen taps for a game.
The resulting dataset of application network traffic contained 107,859 GET / POST HTTP
packets. For this experiment, the dataset is manually separated into a suspicious group and a
normal group. In practice, this separation task would be automatically processed by the payload
checking system, using previously generated signatures. Manual separation would only be needed
to evaluate the signatures’ detection rate and at the initial start-up. The suspicious group consisted
of packets containing sensitive information. The normal group was made up of those not containing
sensitive information. Again, considered UDIDs (Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and SIM Serial ID),
hashed UDIDs (MD5, SHA1), and carrier name to be sensitive information.
In this experiment, encrypted packets were not concerned, and did not observe any applications
which nondeterministically changed or obfuscated sensitive information. In addition, the dataset
did not contain mail addresses, address lists or changeable parameters such as location. Therefore,
this evaluation does not include nondeterministic or obfuscation signatures except the hashes
mentioned above. The suspicious group consisted of 23,309 HTTP packets, and the normal group
contained 84,550 HTTP packets. The details of the suspicious group are shown in Table 3.3.
Selected N HTTP packets at random out of the suspicious group for signature generation and
screening, where N was increased from 100 up to 600 in intervals of 100. Finally, the generated
signatures is applied to the dataset in its entirely to see how accurately they could identify packets
containing sensitive information.
3.5.2 Experimental Results
Figure 3.4 shows the results of this experiment. Evaluation of the percentage of true positives,
false positives, and false negatives for varying values of N.
True Positive: a correctly detected packet containing sensitive information. The percentage of
true positives was calculated according to the following equation:
TP =
number of detected sensitive information packets − N
number of sensitive information packets − N
There were 23,309 sensitive information packets in the dataset for this evaluation. Proposed system
produced 85% true positives at sampling size N = 100. It grew to > 90% by N = 200, with the best
result being 97% at N = 600. These results show that true positives rise as the number of signature
Division of Industrial Innovation Sciences
Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology
Chapter 3 Detection of Sensitive Information Leakage in Android Applications 57
Figure 3.4 Detection Rate of Sensitive Information Leakage.
generating sensitive information packets increases, implying that signatures generated from more
packets cover a wider common pattern of information leakage.
False Negative: a sensitive packet that was not correctly detected. The calculation is percentage
of false negative results using following equation:
FN =
number of undetected sensitive information packets
number of sensitive information packets − N
As stated above, there were 23,309 sensitive packets in the dataset. In this experiment, there were
15% false negatives at N = 100, only 8% or less for N ≥ 200, and finally 3% at N = 600.
Thus, effective detection of information leakage is improved by increasing the number of sensitive
information packets used for generating signatures.
False Positive: a non-sensitive packet incorrectly detected as sensitive. the percentage of false
positives is calculated using following equation:
FP =
number of detected non-sensitive information packets
number of non-sensitive information packets
This value is important for an evaluation of proposed system’s signatures detection rate in terms of
practicality. If proposed system produces many false positives, users will be continually bothered
by unnecessary warnings and prompts. This dataset had 84,550 non-sensitive information packets.
The signatures from this dataset produced 0.3% false positives at N = 100, 0.9% at N = 200, and
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eventually 3.2% at N = 600. More general signatures are generated by increasing the number of
clustering packets. Lrge signature generating sets produce signatures that detect packets without
relation to their information leakage.
3.6 Discussion
3.6.1 Approach Consideration
Other approaches to preventing sensitive information leakage include taint tracking and
permission framework modifications. In this section, comparing of proposed approach with current
research results, and discuss the limitations of proposed scheme.
These clustering methods use malware traffic with characteristic patterns for clustering. Focused
sensitive information in benign traffic using novel packet distance measures. Proposed approach is
applied to a real dataset to test for sensitive information leakage.
Clustering in general is useful for pulling together patterns in large amounts of data, but the
number of the generated signatures tend to increase with cluster size, and can produce signatures
that match most network packets (e.g., POST *, GET *, * HTTP/1.1 ), if signature generation is
applied carelessly. For this reason, it has been difficult for a signatures approach to achieve high
detection rates using a real dataset.
3.6.2 Complexity Analysis
the time and space complexity of the worst case for clustering and signature generation
algorithms are analyzed.
Take the clustering input to be size N packets. The time complexity is O(N3), as there are N
steps and at each step the packet distance matrix of at worst size N2 must be updated and searched.
The space complexity is O(N2) because the packet distance matrix must be stored.
Take the signature generation input to consist of M clusters. The time complexity is O(M), as
there are M steps each with a comparison of a cluster’s LCS to that of its children. The space
complexity is O(M2), as the matrix of the clusters’ LCS must be stored.
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3.7 Conclusion
Application developers adopt advertisement service revenue mechanisms. These application
with regards to security and privacy risk, then Investigation of application behavior is important to
protect personal information. Many Android applications permission require sensitive information
access and network features, and that among them are applications that connect to many outside
servers without the user’s acknowledgment. Moreover, observation of applications’ network
behavior contains a large amount of sensitive information, particularly immutable identifiers such
as UDIDs. The proposed information leakage protection method is contributed as follows.
• In order to detect sensitive information leakage from applications, proposed novel clustering
method using HTTP packet distances contains both the distance between HTTP packet
destinations and the distance between HTTP packet contents. For improving detection
accuracy, approach uses clustering method in combination with signature generation and
signature screening.
• On experimental results with dataset consists with 1,188 applications and 107,859 packets.
It has 23,309 sensitive information packets, approach shown that 97% accurate detection of
packets containing sensitive data with only 3% false positives.
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Table 3.2 HTTP packet destinations. This table shows the number of packets sent to each HTTP
host destination, and the number of applications that send packets to each HTTP host destination.
HTTP Host Destination # Packets # Apps
doubleclick.net 5786 407
admob.com 1299 401
google-analytics.com 3098 353
gstatic.com 1387 333
google.com 3604 308
yahoo.co.jp 1756 287
ggpht.com 940 281
googlesyndication.com 938 244
ad-maker.info 3391 195
nend.net 1368 192
mydas.mobi 332 164
amoad.com 583 116
flurry.com 335 119
microad.jp 868 103
adwhirl.com 548 102
i-mobile.co.jp 3729 100
adlantis.jp 237 98
naver.jp 3390 82
adimg.net 315 72
mbga.jp 1048 63
rakuten.co.jp 502 56
fc2.com 163 52
medibaad.com 1162 49
mediba.jp 427 48
mobclix.com 260 48
gree.jp 228 45
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Table 3.3 Sensitive Information. This table shows for each type of information considered
sensitive, the number of packets containing the information, the number of applications that send
those packets, and the number of destinations to which those packets go.
Sensitive Information # Packets # Apps # Destinations
ANDROID ID 7590 21 75
ANDROID ID MD5 10058 433 21
ANDROID ID SHA1 1247 47 12
CARRIER 2095 135 44
IMEI (Device ID) 3331 171 94
IMEI MD5 692 59 15
IMEI SHA1 1062 51 13
IMSI (Subscriber ID) 655 16 22
SIM Serial ID 369 13 18
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Chapter 4
Detecting and Characterizing of Mobile
Advertisement Network Traffic
4.1 Introduction
Advertisement (ad) modules access sensitive user data and send this information to outside
servers using the device’s network connection [31, 54, 56]. If the user does not have the opportunity
to accept or deny the ad module behavior, this is a privacy violation. Grace et al showed that more
than 100 ad modules distribute users’ sensitive information [55].
Examined the applications’ network traffic, and found that 797 applications included 45 known
ad modules [31, 54, 55, 56]. These have characteristic network traffic patterns for acquiring ad
content, specifically images. In order to identify ad modules’ network traffic, a novel method
based on the distance between network traffic graphs mapping the relationships between HTTP
session data (such as HTML or JavaScript). The similarity between the sessions that derives a
detection of ad modules’ traffic by comparing session graphs with the graphs of already known ad
modules.
Of proposed approach that converts the network traffic into graphs. The result shows that
dataset consisted of 4,698 graphs from ad network sessions (called ad graphs), and 16,205 graphs
of other network sessions. Using 1,000 randomly selected known ad graphs as training set,
proposed approach were able to identify 76% of the other known ad graphs. This training set
does not includes one vertex graphs. Since some ad modules have different network patterns, a
real world system would need to carefully select ad graphs that covering ad modules’ network
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Figure 4.1 An overview of an ad modules’ network behavior. Application bundles include ad
modules, which connect to their suppliers’ servers to download ad images or provide user statistics.
behavior. Evaluation of proposed approach using 6,093,682 packets generated by 1,188 free
Android applications from the Top 100 and the Recent Uploads lists in Google Play Japan. Known
ad graph subset to 2,000 other session graphs (referred to as candidate ad graphs) and 2,000 graphs
from standard application traffic (referred to as standard graphs) which were manually identified
as representing as yet unknown ad modules network traffic. In this evaluation, proposed method
accurately detected 96% of candidate ad graphs and under 10% false positive rate of standard
graphs. Additionally, the examination of an effect of one vertex graphs in training set for detection
rate. In the result, training set without one vertex graphs shows improved detection rate 6.7% of
known ad graphs and 3.5% of candidate ad graphs.
The main contributions is considered to be:
• A method for generating graphs of HTTP sessions that can be used to show relationships
between sessions.
• A process, using this method, for detecting ad module traffic even when it is interleaved with
normal application traffic.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Permission Framework
Android provides a permission framework for an application privileges management.
Permissions are linked to specific resources and an application needs the appropriate permission
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to access a specific resource. At the time of writing, there are 151 permissions defined by Android
API level 21 [134].
4.2.2 Advertisement Modules
Figure 4.1 shows an ad module’s network behavior. In general, an ad module is an SDK provided
by the ad service provider, and is executed as part of the application. During execution, an ad
module connects to its provider’s server.
Ad modules usually provide the following three features. First, an ad delivery service that
periodically gets ad images and displays them on the user’s device. Second, a mediation service
that combines multiple ad delivery services. Mediation services optimize ad processing by
accessing device information. Third, ad modules collect user statistics, such as application
run-time information history and device location, and periodically send this information to outside
servers. Typical ad modules are Google’s admob [137], Mobclix [138], and Flurry [139]. Admob
uses the device identification number for targeted ads. Mobclix connects multiple ad services,
in different applications, and adjusts its ad images accordingly. Flurry collects a run-time log of
application behavior to generate user statistics.
4.3 Problem Description
4.3.1 Advertisement Modules Behavior
Typical ad module behavior is shown in Figure 4.2. If an application uses an ad module, the
application must acquire the permissions required by the ad module. This process can build a
sense of distrust for two reasons. In some cases, the ad module takes advantage of the essential
permissions required by the application but not required for ad module operation. In other cases,
the application does not require certain permissions, but requests these permissions on behalf of
the ad module.
Many applications’ permission combinations require both INTERNET and sensitive
information (e.g., LOCATION, PHONE STATE and CONTACTS) permissions in the section
3.3. The ad modules attached to these applications can access sensitive information without
additional user acknowledgment, and send it to outside servers. The Android permission
framework does not support a privilege separation granularity on the level of SDK, so the user
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Figure 4.2 An overview of the organization and permissions of an application that includes an ad
module. The ad module can use the application’s permissions the access sensitive information on
the device and send it over the network.
cannot limit the part of an application’s permissions that applies only to the ad module SDK.
Therefore, if a user notices privacy violations carried out by the ad module, she cannot restrict the
application’s network behavior without rewriting the application.
4.3.2 Advertisement Modules Traffic Analysis
HTTP Sessions
In order to understand ad modules’ network behavior in detail, The HTTP GET requests in
the network traffic data is collected and analyzed from 1,188 free applications. Table 4.1 shows
the number of HTTP GET requests sent for each content type. Table 4.2 details the image sizes
generally downloaded by the various content types in HTTP responses. In the HTTP GET requests
are investigated, the most common request was for image files, and the second most common was
for text. In HTTP GET responses, the most common response image size was 320 x 50. The
images of this size, and they primarily represented ads for various services are manually reviewed
(e.g., games, goods). Therefore, almost all 320 x 50 images are downloaded by ad modules.
Advertisement image downloading
The analysis of HTTP GET requests shows that applications downloading images are likely
to be doing so for an ad module. Examination of how many ad modules were included in
analyzed applications, and inspected each ad module’s sequence of network traffic during ad image
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Table 4.1 The number of HTTP GET requests for each type of with content. The most commonly
requested content types (in decreasing order) are image files, script files, and document files.
Content Type # HTTP GET Requests
jpg 13941
png 12539
gif 9197
php 5888
js 5114
css 2870
html 2093
json 841
txt 380
jpeg 282
JPG 128
Total 53273
downloads. A set of 120 already known ad modules is used for this investigation [31, 54, 55, 56].
To detect the suspicious ad modules’ network traffic, these are filtered packets by the ‘Host’ field
in the HTTP header contained a known ad module’s name. This is rough selection method of ad
modules’ network traffic, it is manually comprehended the detail of these traffic whether is ad or
not.
Table 4.3 shows the number of applications that include certain ad modules, and the methods
that those ad modules used to download images. Analyzed applications’ network traffic contained
traffic from 45 known ad modules; and 797 applications included at least one ad module. Google’s
ad modules “doubleclick.net” and “admob.com” were widely used. Japanese ad modules such as
“adlantis.jp” and “mediba.jp” are identified. In addition, some applications contained mediation
service modules (“adwhirl.com”, “mobclix.com” and “mobfox.com”) and others had multiple
ad modules. Analysis result shows that application ad module usage varies depending on the
environment of device (e.g., country, network).
A set of rules that define the process of downloading an ad image is identified. The HTTP
sessions consist of HTML, JavaScript, and HTTP redirects. An HTTP redirect that causes data to
be fetched from a different URL, HTML and JavaScript is effective for ad delivery, because they
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Table 4.2 Content types banner image sizes in HTTP GET responses. Banners of size 320x50 are
most commonly downloaded by ad modules. Banners of size 300x48 are the next most common.
Content Type Image Size
320x48 320x50 300x48 300x50
jpg 57 278 2 4
png 271 870 0 59
gif 248 1197 0 115
jpeg 25 249 0 20
Total 601 2594 2 198
Figure 4.3 An overview of proposed approach. First, the known ad module network traffic is
separated out. Next, ad graphs from the remaining network traffic is extracted by comparing the
candidate graph distance from ad graph. Finally, new ad graphs is predicted.
allow dynamic control on the server side: an ad module can renew an ad image on the user’s device
at any given point in time, and different redirections allow different ad images to be displayed for
each user without having to update the ad module. HTTP redirects and transitions to other domains
used as load balancing method by the Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) that generate ad images,
or provide mediation services for optimizing ad revenue, depending on the device location.
4.4 Approach
In this section, presented methods for: generating graphs from network traffic, and for
calculating the graph distance between two such graphs. Discussion of how graph distance can
be used to detect ad modules’ network traffic as described in Section 4.3. The objective is to detect
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an ad module’s network traffic, specifically the receipt of ad images by an ad module bundled in
an application. The unique pattern of ad module HTTP sessions is focused, which start with an
HTML or JavaScript request, then it downloads ad images, HTML or JavaScript files from a server,
often after one or more redirects. Some HTTP sessions share same cookie is identified.
Figure 4.3 shows proposed approach, which consists of two phases. First, the network traffic is
separated into two groups, and apply proposed graph transformation algorithm to them in order to
generate graph groups representing 1) known ad modules and 2) graphs to be tested for ad content
(candidate ad graphs). In the second phase, detection whether or not a network traffic graph was
generated by an ad module. Specifically, the candidate ad graphs are compared with the known
ad graphs using graph distance, and if the result of graph distance calculation is under a certain
threshold, classified network traffic as ad modules generated.
4.4.1 Graph Definition
In this paper, graph has labeled vertices and labeled edges. Let LV and LE be the finite sets of
possible vertex and edge labels. A graph is a 4-tuple G = (V, E, µ, ν), where V is a set of finite
vertices, E ⊆ V × V is the set of finite edges, µ : V → LV is a function assigning labels to the
vertices, and ν : E → LE is a function assigning labels to the edges. If vi is vertex in V , then
ei j = (vi, v j) is edge between vertices vi and v j in E, and Ei∗ ⊆ E is the set of finite edges of vertex
vi. If V = ∅ then G is an empty graph.
4.4.2 Graph of HTTP Sessions
The graph of HTTP sessions is constructed using an HTTP request and response pair derived
from HTTP headers. Given an HTTP request and response, definition of an HTTP session graph
vertex as the HTTP request and response pair, and the label of that vertex as the HTTP request
line and content type from its HTTP header; that is, the vertex label of HTTP session v is LV(v) =
(rline, ctype).
HTTP is a stateless protocol, which consists mainly of simple exchanges: an HTTP request
from the client and an HTTP response from the server. Even though HTTP sessions do not usually
relate to other HTTP sessions, content data between HTTP sessions can have direct relationships.
Specifically, the ad module traffic discussed in section 4.3.2 involves multiple HTTP sessions
following a standard set of patterns:
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Figure 4.4 Ad module HTTP session graphs. (a) Graph of doubleclick, consisting of 5 vertices
and 4 edges. One image vertex connects to both JavaScript and HTML vertices, while the other
image vertex connects only to the HTML vertex. (b) Graph of mydas, consisting of 8 vertices and
7 edges. All 3 image vertices share the same cookie, but connect to different HTML vertices. One
HTML vertex connects to another HTML vertex, as well as a JavaScript vertex.
• URL in HTTP Message-Body : Based on HTML or JavaScript, the original response
includes URL in HTML or JavaScript, which causes new HTTP requests to start another
HTTP sessions to access to included URL.
• HTTP Cookie : A relationship between multiple HTTP sessions, where the HTTP header
field includes session information for the client and server.
• HTTP Persistent Connections : Multiple HTTP sessions related by their use of one TCP
session.
• HTTP Redirect : HTTP sessions related by one URL forwarding to another URL.
These relationships to be assigned and labeled the edges. Given two HTTP sessions of vertices
v1 and v2, definition of an edge as e12 = (v1, v2) if a relation exists in between v1 and v2, and
definition of the edge label LE(e12) = (url, cookie, persistent, redirect) as the type of relation the
edge represents. i.e., v1 and v2 have only same url, edge label shows LE(e12) = (url) that has the
type of relations in two vertices.
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Figure 4.4 shows two sample graphs extracted from dataset. Both graphs represent relationships
between ad modules’ HTTP sessions, showing how many images and HTML or JavaScript files
are downloaded and connected to each other.
4.4.3 Graph Distance
The similarity of two graph is computed by several graph matching algorithms in [140].
Proposed approach uses graph distance in [141], which computes the most common subgraph
and uses that to determine the similarity between the graphs. Given two non-empty graphs G1 and
G2, definition of the graph distance d(G1,G2) as
d(G1,G2) =
|mcs(G1,G2)|
max(|G1|, |G2|)
where mcs(G1,G2) is a function which returns the most common subgraph of G1 and G2; |G| is
the number of vertices in graph G; and max is a function which returns the greater of its two input
values.
4.4.4 HTTP Session Distance
Computing the distance between HTTP sessions requires two steps. First, graphs are generated
from the network traffic using the graph translation algorithm described in section 4.4.2. Second,
the similarity between the graphs is calculated using the graph distance algorithm from section
4.4.3. The graph distance requires the largest common subgraph between any two graphs, which
is computed using Ullman’s backtrack method [142]. The consistency of HTTP sessions is
determined by matching vertices and edges to find the maximum common subgraph.
Algorithm 1 takes two HTTP session graphs, G1 and G2, as input, and outputs the permutation
matrix P that represents a graph isomorphism from a subgraph of G2 to a subgraph of G1. Let M1
and M2 denote the adjacency matrices of G1 and G2 respectively; n and m, the number of vertices
ofG1 andG2 ; P = (pi, j), the n× n permutation matrix whose initial state is pi j = 0; i, j = 1, . . . , n;
and k, the number of matching vertices between G1 and G2, which is incremented before calling
Backtrack.
The Backtrack function (pseudocode included in Algorithm 1) is designed to find a permutation
matrix that represents a graph isomorphism from G2 to G1. First, Backtrack checks k, and if k
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is bigger than m, Backtrack returns the permutation matrix P. Backtrack then checks whether
the vertices v1,i and v2,k match, and then whether the edges E1,i∗ and E2,k∗ match (lines 13-14). If
vertices and edges both match, Backtrack sets pki ∈ P to 1 and pk j ∈ P to 0, where j = 0 . . . n, i ,
j. Finally, Backtrack determines whether P is a permutation matrix of a subgraph isomorphism
from G2 to G1 by comparing S k,k(M2) to S k,n(P)M1(S k,n(P))T . S k,n(P) denotes the i × n submatrix
of P, and P is valid subgraph isomorphism when S k,k(M2) = S k,n(P)M1(S k,n(P))T . S k,n(P) then
represents the matching of k vertices between G2 and G1. If P is subgraph isomorphism, recursive
on Backtrack after k is incremented.
4.4.5 Vertex and Edge Matching Rules
The vertex and edge matchings are computed using the graph labels. Given two graphs of HTTP
sessions G1 = (V1, E1, µ1, ν1) and G2 = (V2, E2, µ2, ν2), definition of matchings as follows:
• Vertex matching : Two vertices vi ∈ V1 and v j ∈ V2 is considered to be matching if their
all vertex labels LV1(vi) = (rlinei, ctypei) and LV2(v j) = (rline j, ctype j) are the same, i.e.
rlinei = rline j and ctypei = ctype j.
• Edge matching : Two edge groups Ei∗ ⊆ E1 and E j∗ ⊆ E2 is considered to be matching if any
of their contained edge pairs, eia ∈ Ei∗ and e jb ∈ E j∗, have matching labels, where if edge
labels LE1(eia) and LE2(e jb) are equal, then the two edges are matching.
4.5 Evaluation
4.5.1 Experimental Setup
Evaluation dataset contains 1,188 free applications from Google Play Japan’s Top 100 and
Recently Uploaded lists from January to April 2012, and collected the network traffic generated
by running each application manually for 5 to 15 minutes on Android device.
Collected network traffic dataset contained 6,093,682 packets, and the total data size was 5.6
GBytes. There were 5,565,529 HTTP packets, and HTTP GET / POST requests made up 107,859
packets. Graphs are generated from this dataset, resulting in 4,696 generated ad graphs. Table 4.4
shows the number of graphs of each ad module. There were 16,205 other graphs which were not
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generated by known ad modules. However, it is reasonable to assume that these graphs contain
other ad module traffic and standard application traffic.
2,000 of these graphs (candidate ad graphs) are manually classified and 2,000 graphs from
standard traffic (standard graphs), in order to evaluate the validity of proposed approach. All
ad modules’ name and traffic is not be able to collect, because ad modules are developed by a
lot of company in worldwide. Assumption that is proposed approach detects general cases of ad
modules’ traffic with only major ad modules’ graphs. Therefore, candidate ad graphs is classified
and standard graphs to evaluate see if proposed approach has availability of detection or not.
Evaluation process determined which graphs were likely to be ad graphs by carefully investigating
each graph’s topology. If graph contained an image label vertex that, when viewed was an ad
image, it is defined as a candidate ad graph. This step does not depend on ‘Host’ field in the
HTTP header. Assumption that accuracy ad modules’ name are extracted from static analysis of
application. Since ad graphs is only identified by their images, then may be text-based ad modules
that were not considered. Table 4.5 shows the number of candidate ad graphs are able to associate
with an ad module. Encrypted packets were not considered in this experiment.
The entirely of proposed approach is tested as follow. First, an ad module and N ad graphs
at random is selected from each ad module’s known graphs (see Table 4.4) except for one vertex
graphs, where N was raised from 100 to 1,000 in intervals of 100. The N known ad graphs is used
to test how accurately proposed approach could identify other ad graphs, and to see what could be
detected about the 2,000 candidate ad graphs. Additionally, evaluation of false positive rate that
shows how many graphs in 2,000 standard graphs could be detected by N known ad graphs. In
detection rate, investigation shows that one vertex graphs affect to detection rate. the comparison
of detection rate in between training set includes one vertex graphs and other set does not include
it.
4.5.2 Experimental Results
Figure 4.5 shows the number of detected known ad graphs per graph distance, and Figure 4.6
shows the number of detected candidate ad graphs per graph distance. In both cases, the Y axis
shows the number of detected ad graphs, and the X axis, the graph distance between graphs. these
results is used to determine the threshold detecting ad graphs. If the distance between a candidate
and a known ad graph is 1, the graphs are identical, so the candidate must be an ad graph. A
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Table 4.4 The number of graphs associated with each known ad module, converted from the
dataset traffic. Ad modules’ traffic was selected using destination domain matching.
No. Ad Module # Graphs
1 google-analytics.com 1385
2 doubleclick.net 843
3 googlesyndication.com 408
4 admob.com 393
5 medibaad.com 363
6 mediba.jp 188
7 flurry.com 187
8 madserving.cn 131
9 adlantis.jp 114
10 mobclix.com 114
11 mydas.mobi 101
12 adwhirl.com 95
13 mopub.com 54
14 airpush.com 41
15 yicha.jp 35
16 inmobicdn.net 33
17 inmobi.com 31
18 mobfox.com 21
19 jumptap.com 15
20 adfonic.net 14
21 wiyun.com 14
22 mdotm.com 13
23 admarvel.com 12
24 domob.cn 12
25 inmobi-jp.com 10
26-45 others (under 10 graphs) 69
Total 45 4696
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Table 4.5 The number of candidate ad graphs, associated with various ad modules. The traffic
to convert to graphs was selected using domain matching in the HTTP headers and patterns of ad
image downloading.
No. Candidate Ad Module # Graphs
1 ad-stir.com 229
2 ad-maker.info 140
3 nend.net 82
4 i-mobile.co.jp 63
5 microad.jp 58
6 amoad.com 51
7 adsmogo.com 49
8 droidhen.com 37
9 wallsmobile.com 33
10 menue.fm 32
11 pianoman-am.com 29
12 adimg.net 28
13 adlayout.net 28
14 shufoo.net 28
15 naver.jp 26
16 adresult-sp.jp 23
17 edgesuite.net 23
18 durasite.net 23
19 goo-net.com 20
20 carsensor.net 19
21 strikead.com 18
22 adsta.jp 16
23 umeng.com 16
24 madvertise.de 15
25-254 others (under 15 graphs) 914
Total 254 2000
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threshold of 0.5 is selected, because in that case at least half of the graph is an isomorphism to an
ad graph.
Figure 4.7 shows the detection rate of known ad graphs for varying values of N, and Figure 4.8
shows the detection rate of candidate ad graphs for varying values of N, and Figure 4.9 show the
false positive rate of standard graphs for varying values of N. The Y axis shows the detection rate
proposed approach achieves according to the values of N (shown on the X axes).
4.5.3 Training Set Screening
While investigating detection case in the experiments, if a small graph (only one vertex) was
included in the training set, it matched many other small graphs, generating excessive false
positives. Therefore, small graphs is avoided when determining the final training set.
In detail of this decision effect, comparison of detection rate of training set includes one vertex
graphs whether or not. Figure 4.10 shows the improved detection rate of known ad graphs and
candidate ad graphs for varying values of N except for one vertex graphs. used threshold is 0.5 in
both cases. The detection rate are improved at 6.7% by N = 100 to 1.4% by N = 1,000, ad graphs.
In candidate ad graphs, detection rate are decreased at 3.5% by N = 100 to 0.7% by N =1,000.
In proposed method, it derives to a distance is 1 that the case of one vertex graph is compared
with one vertex graph. Then a distance is decreased from 0.5 in two vertices graph. If training set
includes one vertex graphs, almost other one vertex graphs and two vertices graphs are detected as
ad modules’ traffic by proposed method. When training set has small number of graphs, this case
directory affects to detection rate. Therefore, conclusion is one vertex graphs do not model correct
ad modules’ network traffic pattern for training set.
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Detection Rate Consideration
The experimental results show that this approach can detect ad modules’ network traffic using
given ad graphs. The accurate detection of ad modules and false positive of standard traffic rely on
the value of the graph distance threshold.
When detecting other known ad graphs, proposed approach had a 50% detection rate at N =
1, 000 with a graph distance threshold 1, but at only N = 200, the detection rate approached 70%
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Figure 4.5 Graph distance statistics using N known ad graphs to classify other known ad graphs.
Figure 4.6 Graphs distance statistics for candidate ad graphs using N known ad graphs.
Division of Industrial Innovation Sciences
Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology
Chapter 4 Detecting and Characterizing of Mobile Advertisement Network Traffic 78
Figure 4.7 Detection rate of other known ad graphs using N known ad graphs.
Figure 4.8 Detection rate of candidate ad graphs using N known ad graphs.
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Figure 4.9 False positive rate of standard graphs using N known ad graphs.
Figure 4.10 Improved Detection rate of know ad graphs and other known ad graphs using N
known ad graphs except for only one vertex graphs.
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at a graph distance threshold of 0.5. All known ad modules’ groups (regardless of the size of N)
included at least 1 graph from each known ad module. Therefore, the conclusion is a small number
of N known ad graphs can be used to detect almost all ad modules’ network traffic. Different ad
modules produce similar network traffic, which shows that extracting a characteristic graph of an
ad modules network traffic is a good indicator of other ad modules’ network traffic.
When detecting candidate ad graphs, proposed approach only had a 50% rate of detection for all
N > 500 with a graph distance of 1. However, using a graph distance threshold of 0.5 increased
the detection rate to 90% by N = 200, indicating that the number of perfectly isomorphic graphs
does not increase noticeably for N ≥ 500, but that almost all candidate ad graphs are identifiable
at only N = 200 with in a distance of 0.5. This result shows that a small number of known ad
graphs can cover almost all candidate ad module graphs. the conclusion is candidate ad modules
and known ad modules have similar network behavior.
4.6.2 False Detection Rate Consideration
When false detected standard graphs, proposed approach had 1.5% by N = 100 in a graph
distance of 0.5 and 1.0. This rate is increased to under 10% by N = 1, 000. This result shows a
distance of 0.5 has more false positive than a distance of 1.0. It covers variety topology graphs
and not strict matching. Therefore, these reason leads to false positive case at distance of 0.5. The
conclusion is false positive rate is small effected from the number of know ad graphs. Proposed
approach could smoothly distinguish between ad graphs and standard graphs.
4.6.3 Ad Module Network Traffic Consideration
Proposed approach shows only a 70% detection rate for other known ad graphs, but a 90%
detection rate for candidate ad graphs. Ad module’s graphs can exhibit different topologies,
representing different network traffic patterns. Known ad graphs are randomly selected for the
training set, so represents only a part of the other known ad graphs, leading to the relatively low
detection rate. However, if the known ad graphs used for detection are carefully chosen, they
can support a variety of network behavior, resulting a high detection rate. In the experiments, the
candidate ad modules’ behavior (both in the original traffic and in the converted graphs) is similar
to that of known ad modules in the training set, particularly with regard to downloading images. It
is this similarity that leads to proposed approach’s high detection rate for candidate ad graphs.
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The experimental results show that the number of detectable graphs remain fairly consistent for
graph distance values over 0.5 and under 1. Ad modules’ destinations change frequently because
ad modules use cloud services or CDNs for load balancing. Additionally, an ad module update
might influence the module’s network behavior. However, proposed approach considers not only
destination IP addresses but also network traffic patterns including the URLs in HTTP contents, the
HTTP cookies, the HTTP persistent connections, and the HTTP redirects, so proposed approach
can still identify ad modules network traffic with a high level of accuracy.
4.6.4 Complexity Analysis
If the graph matching input is taken to be two graphs of HTTP sessions G1 and G2, the time
complexity is O(|G1||G2||G1 |), as there are |G1| steps and at each step, a permutation matrix of
at worst size |G2||G1 | be must be computed. The space complexity is O(|G1|2|G2|), because the
adjacency matrix of G1 and G2 and the permutation matrix of G1 must be stored.
4.7 Conclusion
Ad services are supplied by ad modules, which can have access to personal information. It is
pointed out that advertisement modules possibly which can violate the user’s privacy. Ad module
network traffic which are constructed by receiving ad contents over the network is characteristic
in applications. Previous works analyzing ad modules aim to identify ad modules with in
applications. These methods disassemble the application, or track information flow on the device.
Proposed approach uses only the network traffic relationships to detect ad modules’ activity and is
thus applicable even if static analysis is can not be used (e.g., large quantities of data in corporate
or WiFi networks). Additionally, while there are a small number of major ad service providers,
many smaller providers are unlikely to be detected by static analysis. However, the experiments
indicate that manually identified ad graphs are similar to known ad graphs, and thus previously
unknown modules could be detected by proposed approach using only a few known ad graphs.
The proposed advertisement traffic detection method is contributed as follows.
• In order to identify ad modules embedded in applications, new method is proposed for ad
module traffic identification. Proposed method generates a graph of ad module network
behavior focusing on the relationships between HTTP sessions, and computes the distance
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between these graphs. In the evaluation, 1,188 Android applications’ network behavior
analyzed, which produced a dataset of 5,565,529 packets. 4,696 graphs of known ad modules
is then generated and 16,205 graphs of other traffic from dataset.
• Proposed approach showed a 76% detection rate when using 1,000 known ad graphs to
identify other known ad graphs, a detection rate of 96% for 2,000 manually selected
candidate ad graphs and under 10% false positive rate for 2,000 manually selected standard
graphs from the remaining 16,205 graphs. To further evaluation, a detection rate difference
is measured when training set includes one vertex graphs. In the result, training set without
one vertex graphs improved detection rates are 6.7% for known ad graphs and 3.5% for
candidate ad graphs.
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Algorithm 1 : Subgraph isomorphism using Ullman’s method
Input: G1 = (V1, E1, µ1, ν1),G2 = (V2, E2, µ2, ν2)
Output: Matrix P, a subgraph isomorphism from G2 to G1
1: n⇐ |V1|
2: m⇐ |V2|
3: M1,M2 are adjacency matrices of G1,G2
4: P = (pi j) is n × n initial permutation matrix
5: k ⇐ 1
6: Backtrack(M1,M2, P, k)
7:
8: function Backtrack (M1,M2, P, k)
9: if k > m then
10: return P
11: end if
12: for all i⇐ 1 to n do
13: if vertex label matches (v1,i, v2,k) then
14: if edge label matches (E1,i∗, E2,k∗) then
15: pki ⇐ 1
16: for all j⇐ 1 to n do
17: if j , i then
18: pk j ⇐ 0
19: end if
20: end for
21: if S k,k(M2) = S k,n(P)M1(S k,n(P))T then
22: Backtrack(M1,M2, P, k + 1)
23: end if
24: end if
25: end if
26: end for
27: end function
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Concluding remarks
In this dissertation, several novel techniques that may be useful in a multi-layered defense
against information leakage were introduced and evaluated.
In Chapter 1, it was argued that multiple layers of defense are an effective countermeasure
for information leakage. The importance of the OS and application layers was stressed. Kernel
vulnerability attacks on the OS being a significant security risk, novel countermeasures are needed
to mitigate this threat. Given the popularity of devices with applications that store user information,
the OS should prevent personal information leakage by novel network detection methods based on
traffic modeling. Three research problems were presented. The first problem is that the adversary
can defeat kernel countermeasures by executing an exploit code that leads to memory corruption
in the kernel mode. Although existing protective methods cannot solve this problem, the proposed
KMO does so by monitoring kernel virtual memory to identify illegal memory overwrites in the
kernel mode. The second and third problems involve applications that leak personal information
for advertising and tracking purposes. Previous security approaches are not able to deal with this
satisfactorily. From a network security perspective, automatic signature generation and inspection
of traffic at the network layer are effective at detecting personal information leaks without requiring
modification of the Android framework. The problem of classification and identification of
advertisement modules was introduced. The proposed network traffic modeling algorithm correctly
converts advertisement module network behavior into a graph, to identify applications contains
what kind of advertisement module is contained in the application.
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In Chapter 2, it was noted that the OS must mitigate various attacks and reduce the attack surface
to prevent hostile exploitation of kernel vulnerabilities. Although KASLR, CFI, KPTI, and SMAP
/ SMEP mitigate kernel vulnerability to memory corruption and thus to privilege escalation or
the avoidance of security features, kernel layer attacks still have the potential to succeed. KMO,
the proposed novel security mechanism, provides a secret observer to monitor the original kernel
virtual memory. KMO has multiple inspection points to determine invalid kernel virtual memory
overwriting, identify malicious system call arguments, and prevent attacks through the direct
mapping region. In an evaluation of Linux, KMO was able to inspect system call arguments
and identify the memory corruption of security features. The performance overhead achieved
mitigation of this in terms of each system call invocation on the kernel. The web application
overhead for KMO monitoring has a small cost at the running process. KMO supports PCID on
TLB, which reduces the overhead penalty of KMO, to decrease the actual cost for monitoring and
virtual memory switching.
In Chapter 3, advertisement services, which are widely accepted among application developers
but pose security and privacy challenges, were considered. Many Android applications require
permissions for sensitive information access and network features; among them are applications
that connect to outside servers without the user’s knowledge. Furthermore, observations
of applications’ network behavior have shown that a large amount of sensitive information,
particularly immutable identifiers such as UDIDs, is routinely transmitted. A novel clustering
method is proposed using HTTP packet distances, including both the distance between HTTP
packet destinations and the distance between HTTP packet contents. This clustering method, in
combination with signature generation and screening, was used on a dataset of actual Android
applications and network packets, including sensitive information packets. The proposed method
was able to achieve highly accurate detection of packets containing sensitive data, at the cost of
relatively small false positives.
In Chapter 4, it was remarked that many “free” applications include ad services in order to obtain
developer revenue. Ad services are supplied by ad modules, which can violate the user’s privacy.
Ad module network traffic is identifiable by its use of HTTP redirection and use of HTML or
JavaScript requests to download ad images. A new method was proposed to identify ad modules
embedded in applications. The proposed method generates a graph of ad module network behavior
focusing on the relationships between HTTP sessions and computes the distance between these
graphs. In the evaluation, the network behavior of actual Android applications was analyzed,
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producing a dataset of network packets. From this dataset, known ad modules graphs and other
traffic graphs were generated. The proposed approach showed a high detection rate when using
the parts of known ad graphs to identify other known ad graphs, a high precision detection rate for
manually selected candidate ad graphs, and a low false positive rate for manually selected standard
graphs from the remaining graphs.
5.2 Future directions
This study has a number of limitations that need to be overcome in the future. In addition, it has
implications for the direction of future research in this field.
(1) OS Monitoring Enhancement
KMO keeps the virtual memory switching functions in the kernel virtual memory space and
then invokes them from the original kernel code. Although the adversary can potentially
target the KMO’s function, KASLR randomizes the virtual memory space, thus obscuring
the KMO function’s virtual addresses. The adversary identifies the valid monitoring data’s
virtual address of direct mapping to calculate manually the position from the physical page’s
virtual address. In response, KMO unmaps the secret pages of the direct mapping space in
the kernel virtual memory to reduce the attack surface. Future research should support other
security features that can run in this secret virtual memory space. This method could prevent
kernel vulnerability attacks that evade the monitoring mechanism of the kernel security
feature. The application overhead should be measured with other benchmark software,
and the cost of increasing the monitoring data should be investigated. Additionally, the
relationship between both monitoring timing and kernel vulnerability effects should be
examined for attack-detection capability.
(2) Application Traffic Monitoring Capability
The using of HTTP packet destination distance allows the proposed system to generate useful
signatures. A concern regarding the use of the destination distance is that two HTTP packets
may have close IP addresses, but be owned by different organizations, thus generating an
erroneously small distance. In practice, this situation is rare, so current implementation
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does not specifically handle it. However, using a registration information process such as
WHOIS could be helpful for the verification of IP addresses and domain names, which could
be used to confirm the distances. The proposed approach also does not focus on encrypted
or obfuscated traffic. It can be difficult to detect sensitive information in SSL traffic, but if
an ad module uses one encryption key for all applications, or applies a deterministic hash
function to sensitive information, the proposed approach can detect it. Some ad modules
collect information supplied by the developers. If this traffic is small, the proposed approach
may not cluster and thus not detect it. Detection would require deeply investigating small
network traffic to determine the causes of sensitive information leakage from characteristic
network behavior. This is a feature to add in the future. Also, the applications investigated
in this study did not send email addresses, address lists, or location information; in future
work, the number and type of applications evaluated should be increased.
(3) Deep Analysis of Suspicious Applications Libraries
The proposed graph modeling process focuses on the sequence of HTTP sessions. However,
ad modules have other characteristic behaviors, such as refreshing images at predictable
intervals and responding to user actions [143]. Automatically modeling and extracting
protocol specifications from network traffic would improve the correctness of the ad module
behavior models; this will be attempted in future work. Other goals include improving the
exactness of the graphs and determining whether a combination of the approaches. Actually,
a detection rate difference was measured when the training set included one vertex graph:
it was found that the training set without the one vertex graph improved detection rates for
known ad graphs and candidate ad graphs. Additionally, consideration should be given to
the possibility of generating more general graphs from multiple known graphs, which would
(ideally) widely cover a variety of ad module network behavior. If this is possible, it would
decrease the total number of graphs without compromising the high detection rate. However,
if such a graph were large, it could increase the time required for graph comparisons. The
graph matching algorithm proposed has improved the time complexity of Ullman’s algorithm
[144], and so should be applied to the proposed approach in the future.
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